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    n 2017, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen 
O’Brien told the Security Council, “we are facing the largest humanitarian 
crisis since the creation of the United Nations . . . more than 20 million 
people across four countries [Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, and Nigeria] 
face starvation and famine.”1 All four crises were produced by armed con-
flict, and, in particular, the resurgent use of starvation as a method of war-
fare.2 At the heart of perhaps the most devastating was the Saudi- and 
Emirati-led coalition’s de facto naval blockade of Yemen.3 U.N. humanitar-
ian coordinator Lise Grande warned in late 2018 that the country was facing 
the world’s worst famine in a century.4 Even as food was allowed in, the 
 
1. Associated Press, World Faces Worst Humanitarian Crisis since 1945, says UN Official, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/11/world-
faces-worst-humanitarian-crisis-since-1945-says-un-official. Alex de Waal describes 
O’Brien’s framing as “hyperbolic” but agreed that “2017 marks a critical turning point, a 
moment at which famine could return.” ALEX DE WAAL, MASS STARVATION: THE HISTORY 
AND FUTURE OF FAMINE 179 (2018). On the role of armed conflict, and particularly the use 
of starvation as a method of warfare, in precipitating these crises, see FOOD SECURITY IN-
FORMATION NETWORK, 2018 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES (2018), 
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000069227/download/?_ga=2.155628472. 
2098461776.1600107968-1595877267.1600107968 [hereinafter 2018 GLOBAL REPORT ON 
FOOD CRISES]; U.N. Secretary-General’s Joint Press Conference on Humanitarian Crises in 
Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.un.org/ 
sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2017-02-22/full-transcript-secretary-generals-joint-
press-conference. 
2. 2018 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES, supra note 1; U.N. Secretary-General’s 
Joint Press Conference, supra note 1. On the resurgence of famine as a consequence of 
deliberate policy, see DE WAAL, MASS STARVATION. supra note 1, at 6–7. For earlier iterations 
of the claim that famine is caused by political choices, see ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: 
POLITICS AND THE DISASTER RELIEF INDUSTRY IN AFRICA 7 (1997); AMARTYA SEN, DE-
VELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 160, 175 (1999); David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 
97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245, 245 (2003). 
3. It is not clear whether or for how long the naval encirclement of Yemen has qualified 
as a blockade in the strict sense, because there is ambiguity regarding whether the concept 
exists in non-international armed conflicts, enforcement has occurred within Yemen’s ter-
ritorial sea, and for the most part the preclusion of ingress and egress has not been compre-
hensive. Martin D. Fink, Naval Blockade and the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, 64 NETHER-
LANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 291, 297–303 (2017). 
4. Hannah Summers, Yemen on Brink of ‘World's Worst Famine in 100 Years’ if War Contin-













blockade limited the quantity, delayed, and otherwise impeded its delivery, 
caused dramatic spikes in prices, and devastated the economy and thus the 
capacity of most people in the country to pay those prices.5 A few months 
after Grande’s warning, World Food Programme spokesperson Herve Ver-
hoosel claimed that approximately ten million Yemenis were “one step away 
from famine.”6 Aid operations delayed devastation on that scale, but the con-
sequence of the longstanding deprivation is that the population is now 
uniquely vulnerable to the gravest ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic. 7 Re-
cent cuts to essential aid have further exacerbated the crisis.8 
In the last century, the law of armed conflict and other relevant regimes 
have transitioned from permitting the starvation of the civilian population in 
war with little restraint, to weakly regulating it, subsequently prohibiting it, 
and ultimately classifying the starvation of the civilian population as a war 
crime and a core object of concern for the U.N. Security Council.9 Despite 
its recent resurgence in practice, as a matter of law, the starvation of civilians 
has gone from being accepted as a purportedly humane method of warfare 
to a being condemned as gravely wrongful and identified as a reason for 
global scrutiny and action. Nonetheless, the boundaries of many of these 
legal developments have yet to be tested or clearly defined. The nature and 
scope of their applicability to naval blockades in particular remain the subject 
of debate and confusion.  
A unique opportunity exists to bring clarity to this issue. Under the aus-
pices of the Institute for International Humanitarian Law, an international 
group of experts has started to deliberate on an update to the San Remo Man-
ual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. The original Manual 
 
5. Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, Situation of Human 
Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses since September 2014, ¶¶ 768–71, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/42/CRP.1* (Sept. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Group of Experts on Yemen]; Jane Fergu-
son, Is Intentional Starvation the Future of War?, NEW YORKER (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/is-yemen-intentional-starvation-the-fu-
ture-of-war.  
6. 10 Million Yemenis ‘One Step Away from Famine,’ UN Food Agency Calls for ‘Unhindered 
Access’ To Frontline Regions, UN NEWS (Mar. 26, 2019), https://news.un.org/ 
en/story/2019/03/1035501. 
7. Richard Stone, Yemen Was Facing the World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis. Then the Coro-
navirus Hit, SCIENCE (May 28, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/yemen-
was-facing-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-then-coronavirus-hit.  
8. Vivian Yee, Yemen Aid Falls Short, Threatening Food and Health Programs, NEW YORK 
TIMES (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/world/middleeast/yemen-
saudi-united-nations-aid.html. 












was adopted in 1994, after six years of similar expert discussions and consul-
tations, and published with a formal “Explanation” the following year.10 
Much like later efforts to restate the customary international law applicable 
to air warfare and cyber warfare, it provides an important first port of call 
for any lawyer working in a domain covered only incompletely by existing 
treaty law.11 An effort to develop an analogous text for military operations 
in space is ongoing.12 
Much of the discussion in the update process is likely to focus on ad-
dressing the profound technological change that has occurred in the quarter-
century since the publication of the first edition. Developments in the realms 
of cyberspace, machine learning, and vessel and weapon system autonomy 
raise legal questions that were beyond the comprehension of the original 
drafters. There are questions that must be confronted as the new group of 
experts contemplates how to articulate the principles and commentaries 
upon which legal advisers, scholars, and analysts will draw when evaluating 
naval conflicts in the coming years and decades. 
However, at least as important are the more fundamental tasks of inter-
rogating the original rules on their own terms and adapting the text to nor-
mative developments in the period since publication. If pursued rigorously, 
revisions arising from these latter projects may well eclipse those responding 
to technological change. To that end, this article engages in a reevaluation of 
the San Remo rules on the deprivation of objects essential to survival, which 
are included in the Manual’s framework for the regulation of blockade war-
fare. The San Remo rules go beyond previous articulations of the law of 
blockade in identifying humanitarian restrictions on the practice. However, 
the fact of those restrictions obscures a surprisingly permissive posture on 
starvation blockades. It is a posture that is objectionable both on its own 
terms and in light of legal and normative developments since the Manual’s 
adoption. In advocating significantly tighter humanitarian constraints, this 
 
10. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SRM]. 
11. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WAR-
FARE (2009) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL]; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013); TALLINN MANUAL 
2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt 
gen. ed., 2017).  
12. On the effort to draft the Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military 
Space Operations, see The Woomera Manual, UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE, https://law.ade-












article responds directly to recent efforts on the pages of this Journal to de-
fend the legality of intentional starvation in blockades and other encircle-
ments. 13 At a moment when the proscription of such tactics is tightening, it 
is vital that this progress is recognized in the San Remo update. 
The argument proceeds in five Parts. Part II provides a brief history of 
the trajectory of international humanitarian law (IHL) on encirclement, the 
deprivation of essentials, and humanitarian access. Part III exposes the weak-
nesses and contradictions in the key humanitarian provisions on the law of 
blockade, as articulated in the San Remo Manual. Part IV identifies the legal 
and policy arguments offered in favor of a permissive law of blockade—
perhaps one even more permissive than that articulated in the original edi-
tion of the San Remo Manual. Part V rebuts those arguments, presenting the 
legal and moral case for strengthening the humanitarian restrictions on 
blockades in the revised edition. Part VI identifies two macro trends that 
demand the detailed attention of those charged with updating the Manual, 
both on the specific issue of blockades, but also across the Manual as a whole, 
namely: the expansion of IHL rules applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts (NIACs) and the now widespread recognition of the applicability 
of international human rights law (IHRL) in armed conflict.  
 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW OF ENCIRCLEMENT, DEPRIVATION, 
AND HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 
 
For much of the modern history of war, starvation tactics were deemed to 
be a necessary and thus permissible method of warfare.14 Hugo Grotius and 
Emer de Vattel both considered and affirmed the use of hunger as a weapon 
in their writings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively.15 
In the nineteenth century, one of the landmark codification efforts in this 
 
13. Sean Watts, Humanitarian Logic and the Law of Siege: A Study of the Oxford Guidance 
on Relief Actions, 94 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1 (2019); Phillip J. Drew, Can We Starve 
the Civilians? Exploring the Dichotomy between the Traditional Law of Maritime Blockade and Human-
itarian Initiatives, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 302 (2019). 
14. Charles A. Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Conflict: The Modern Hu-
manitarian Law, 19 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 1, 31 
(1989); Nicholas Mulder & Boyd van Dijk, Why Did Starvation Not Become the Paradigmatic War 
Crime in International Law?, in CONTINGENCY AND THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Kevin Jon Heller & Ingo Venzke eds., forthcoming). 
15. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 2, ¶ 10 (1625); 2 EMER 












realm was Francis Lieber’s U.S. General Orders No. 100, drafted on the re-
quest of Abraham Lincoln as a framework for regulating both sides of the 
American Civil War.16 On the question of the use of hunger as a weapon, 
Lieber did not equivocate. Starvation, including of civilians, was permissible 
because it could facilitate victory. Article 17 of the Code provides, “it is law-
ful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the 
speedier subjection of the enemy.”17 Article 18 clarifies the claimed im-
portance of including civilians as targets for hunger: “When a commander 
of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number 
of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme 
measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender.”18 
It was not until several decades after Lieber’s endeavor that States nego-
tiated the first significant multilateral treaties governing the conduct of hos-
tilities at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The Hague Regulations 
were attached first to Convention II of 189919 and then, in their updated 
form, to Convention IV of 1907.20 Although neither version replicates 
Lieber’s overt approval of starvation tactics, the Regulations’ silence on the 
issue is itself significant. Starvation is not identified in Article 23 of either 
treaty as a method of war that is “especially prohibited.”21 Article 25 of each 
prohibits only attack or bombardment (in the 1907 version “by whatever 
means”) of undefended localities. 22 And Article 27 provides that in sieges and 
bombardments of defended localities, a besieging party must take all neces-
sary steps to spare “buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable 
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and 
 
16. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter General Orders No. 
100]. For a comprehensive overview of the code and its relationship to the law of war, see 
JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012). 
17. General Orders No. 100, supra note 16, art. 17 (emphasis added). 
18. Id. art. 18. 
19. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 
Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter Hague Regulations 1899]. 
20. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations 1907]. 
21. Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 19, art. 23; Hague Regulations 1907, supra note 
20, art. 23. 
22. Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 19, art. 25; Hague Regulations 1907, supra note 












wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for mil-
itary purposes.”23 Starvation and other forms of deprivation by encirclement 
are left unregulated—a silence that would echo through the courtrooms of 
Nuremberg forty years later. 
Not long after the Second Hague Conference, and inspired in significant 
part by its Twelfth Convention (on the creation of an International Prize 
Court), the British government convened a conference of ten naval powers 
in London to agree what became the non-binding London Declaration Con-
cerning the Laws of Naval War (1909).24 In the first twenty-one articles, the 
Declaration went far beyond the laconic assertion of an efficacy requirement 
in the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law to elaborate and 
crystallize many of the key features of blockade law that remain applicable 
today.25 These include the principles and derivative rules of efficacy, impar-
tiality, notification, enforcement, and neutrality.26 Notably, however, the 
framework included no provisions protecting the encircled civilian popula-
tion against the potentially severe deprivation that follows from a compre-
hensive blockade. Under the understanding of the law articulated in the Lon-
don Declaration, the infliction of mass starvation remained very much within 
the blockading party’s authority. 
The possible illegality of such methods started to percolate in significant 
form in the aftermath of World War I. The parties to the Paris Peace Con-
ference set up a Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War 
and on Enforcement of Penalties to investigate the issue of war crimes re-
sponsibility during the Great War. In its 1919 report, the Commission listed 
“deliberate starvation of civilians” as a violation to which criminal liability 
 
23. Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 19, art. 27; Hague Regulations 1907, supra note 
20, art. 27. 
24. Declaration Concerning the Laws of Maritime War, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 Consol. T.S. 
338, reprinted in THE DECLARATION OF LONDON, FEBRUARY 26, 1909, at 112 (James B. 
Scott ed., 1919) [hereinafter Declaration of London]. 
25. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 MAR-
TENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907) [hereinafter Paris Declaration]. 












could attach. 27 However, efforts to establish a system of international crim-
inal accountability after World War I failed, and the Commission’s proposal 
regarding starvation was never enacted.28 
There was also a dark irony in the inclusion of starvation in the list. As 
Nicholas Mulder and Boyd van Dijk recount, “To pressure the Dutch gov-
ernment to extradite the exiled Kaiser” for alleged crimes committed during 
the Great War (the very subject of the Commission’s work), “British foreign 
secretary Arthur Balfour . . . suggested imposing a blockade of the Nether-
lands, accepting that the neutral country might have to be starved into sub-
mission” to secure the transfer.29 Balfour’s proposal was not implemented, 
but restraint in that respect was not for squeamishness as to the conse-
quences. The Allies had engaged in a comprehensive naval blockade of Ger-
many, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria during the war 
and had “caused hundreds of thousands of deaths” and contributed to a 
“major social, economic, and health crisis” by maintaining the blockade after 
the armistice in order to pressure Germany to sign the final Peace Treaty.30 
After the war, economic blockades were championed as a mechanism 
for preventing armed conflict.31 Although preliminary efforts were made 
through the League of Nations to conceive of regulations that would limit 
their effects on civilian populations, the only constraint agreed upon was that 
the interception of food supplies would be used only after other means of 
conflict resolution had been exhausted.32 In the law of armed conflict, no 
changes were made to the existing treaty regime. When World War II 
erupted, the tactic was seen by all parties as very much on the table. The 
Nazis distinguished themselves in using starvation not just as a method of 
war, but also as a central component of their system of genocidal extermina-
 
27. Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), reprinted in 14 AMER-
ICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 114 (1920). 
28. On the efforts to pursue criminal justice for alleged German perpetrators after 
World War I, see GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS 
OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS ch. 3 (2002). 















tion and persecution—the infamous “hunger plan” implemented to elimi-
nate “useless eaters.”33 However, every major power weaponized mass hun-
ger in the conduct of hostilities, causing enormous suffering and death.34 
In contrast to the failed efforts after the Great War, the Allies were suc-
cessful in creating a system of criminal justice to be applied to their defeated 
adversaries after World War II.35 The flagship of that effort was the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, at which twenty-two of the 
most senior Nazi war criminals were tried before a judge each from France, 
Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.36 Various acts of starvation 
were prosecuted successfully at the IMT as war crimes or crimes against hu-
manity, but those instances involved the starvation of prisoners of war, pop-
ulations in Nazi-occupied territory, the enslaved, and Jews subject to geno-
cidal persecution.37 When it came to starvation as a method of warfare, the 
results were very different. 
The IMT was supplemented by military tribunals run individually by the 
occupying powers for the next tier of alleged perpetrators. These subsequent 
proceedings were run pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, a regulation 
issued by the occupying powers as a collective and replicating much of what 
was in the London Charter (the IMT statute that had been drafted by the 
four powers in August 1945).38 Included in Control Council Law No. 10 was 
an open-ended provision of criminal accountability for “atrocities or of-
fenses against persons or property constituting violations of the laws or cus-
toms of war.”39 
In the case against fourteen of the highest-ranking members of the 
Wehrmacht, some of whom had been members of the Nazi High Command, 
the American military tribunal was faced with the question of whether the 
siege of Leningrad from 1941 to 1944, in which over a million Russians died, 
 
33. DE WAAL, MASS STARVATION, supra note 1, at 101–5. 
34. Mulder & van Dijk, supra note 14 (“Every major power during the Second World 
War sought to deprive enemy combatants and civilians of the necessary food supplies as a 
means of securing their eventual surrender.”); ARTHUR HERMAN, TO RULE THE WAVES 
535, 545 (2004). On the role of food in World War II generally, see LIZZIE COLLINGHAM, 
THE TASTE OF WAR: WORLD WAR TWO AND THE BATTLE FOR FOOD (2011). 
35. On the politics that led to that, see BASS, supra note 28, ch. 5. 
36. 22 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL 411 (1948). 
37. See, e.g., id. at 456, 472, 474, 478, 480, 482, 484, 495, 541–44. 
38. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes 
Against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 1945), 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL 
COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50 (1946), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp. 












met the legal threshold prescribed in Control Council Law No. 10.40 The 
tribunal’s ruling on that question has reverberated throughout subsequent 
work on the posture of the law of war vis-à-vis starvation. It cited the brand-
new second edition of Charles Cheney Hyde’s general treatise on interna-
tional law for the following proposition: 
 
A belligerent commander may lawfully lay siege to a place controlled by the 
enemy and endeavor by a process of isolation to cause its surrender. The 
propriety of attempting to reduce it by starvation is not questioned. Hence, 
the cutting off of every source of sustenance from without is deemed legit-
imate.41 
 
Famously, the tribunal then editorialized, “we might wish the law were 
otherwise but we must administer it as we find it.”42 In this phrase, the Amer-
ican judges of the High Command case expressed less comfort with the per-
missibility of starvation as a weapon of war than had earlier legal authorities, 
but insisted nonetheless that the existing legal resources were insufficient to 
underpin a more prohibitive interpretation. Given the morally infused and 
creative legal reasoning adopted at Nuremberg on other fronts, this unwill-
ingness to interpret an open-ended provision to conform to the law for 
which the judges claimed to wish is striking. It ought to be considered along-
side the fact that the absence of a prohibition of starvation tactics was a legal 
opening their home country had exploited during the conflict.43 One of the 
intellectual architects of the Nuremberg doctrine of crimes against humanity, 
Hersch Lauterpacht, later reflected, “The practice of two world wars was 
based on the view that no such sacrosanctity attaches to the civilian popula-
tion at large as to make illegal the effort to starve it alongside the military 
forces of the enemy as a means of inducing him to surrender.”44 It was a 
 
40. United States v. von Leeb et al. (The High Command Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, at 462, 555, 563 (1949). 
41. Id. at 563, citing 3 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1802–3 (2d ed. 
1945). 
42. Id. 
43. See supra note 34. 
44. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRITISH YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 360, 374 (1952). On Lauterpacht’s role prior to Nuremberg 
on the issue of crimes against humanity, see PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET 3, 113–












method of warfare that the United States and Britain would prove reluctant 
to foreclose in the post-war era.45 
The first opportunity for a recalibration of the law of war on this issue 
arose with the revisions to the Geneva Conventions, and particularly the ad-
dition of a Fourth Convention on civilian protection. On the issue of the 
starvation of occupied populations, the drafters of the Fourth Convention 
were able to agree on relatively robust provisions. Under Article 55, the Oc-
cupying Power has “the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of 
the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, 
medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are 
inadequate.”46 This is supplemented by an unequivocal obligation in Article 
59 to consent to and facilitate relief schemes (particularly of food, medical 
supplies, and clothing) for that population if it is “inadequately supplied.”47 
The Convention is far weaker on the issue of siege starvation and hunger 
blockades. As one might expect of those negotiating a treaty in the Geneva 
law tradition, the angle from which the drafters approached this issue was 
one of humanitarian access, rather than the conduct of hostilities.48 In the 
early stages of work on the new and updated conventions, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had argued for certain robust civilian 
protections in siege and blockade starvation campaigns.49 Although this ap-
proach drew British and American opposition,50 it gained traction with a 
number of other States, including the Soviet Union. 51 In response to that 
 
45. Mulder & van Dijk, supra note 14. 
46. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
55, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
47. Id. art. 59. 
48. The distinction between so-called Hague law and Geneva law was never without 
conceptual difficulty. Even the first Geneva Convention in 1864 provided in Article 1 for 
the neutrality of hospitals—simultaneously a protection for the wounded and a rule govern-
ing the conduct of hostilities. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in the Armies in the Field art. 1, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377. 
49. 3 COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF CONVENTIONS 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS (GENEVA APRIL 14–26, 1947): PRELIMINARY 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: CON-
DITION AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN TIME OF WAR 27 (1947); INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE OF GOV-
ERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF THE CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
WAR VICTIMS 15 (1947); OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVEN-
TION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 178 
(1958). 













groundswell, the British focused on “reshaping rather than rejecting the ex-
isting proposals” to regulate the protection of encircled and starving popu-
lations.52 
A Norwegian drafter proposed a compromise that ultimately led to the 
provision codified in the Fourth Convention.53 The finally agreed provision 
requires parties to allow medical and religious supplies through to adversary 
territory, only when those supplies are “intended only for civilians” and ex-
tends this requirement to “essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics” only 
when those consignments are “intended for children under fifteen, expectant 
mothers and maternity cases.”54 As such, it allows for the deliberate denial 
of food and clothing to the civilian population more broadly.  
Moreover, even those limited obligations are subject to exception if the 
belligerent has “serious reasons for fearing” that the consignments may “be 
diverted from their destination,” that control over them “may not be effec-
tive,” or even that the relief consignments would provide a “definite military 
advantage” to the adversary by substituting for goods that would have been 
provided by the latter State.55 This, of course, is a caveat so capacious as to 
“pull[] the rug from under even the qualified protection” of the core require-
ment,56 diluting the “obligatory content” of the latter to “nearly nothing.”57 
At best, a non-occupying power’s duty under Geneva Convention IV to al-
low essential goods through to deprived civilians might be described as 
“somewhat nominal.”58 
The Convention also touches obliquely on the practice (permitted ex-
plicitly in the Lieber Code) of driving fleeing civilians back into an encircled 
and starved area. Article 17 of Convention IV requires that the parties to the 
conflict “endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from be-
sieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, chil-
dren and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, 
medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas.” 59 




54. GC IV, supra note 46, art. 23. 
55. Id. 
56. Marcus, supra note 2, at 266. 
57. René Provost, Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the United Nations Food Block-
ade Against Iraq and Kuwait, 30 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 577, 592 
(1992).  
58. Lauterpacht, supra note 44, at 376. 












among the items to be let in. Moreover, the besieging party has only an ob-
ligation to endeavor to conclude such an agreement with the besieged party. 
There is no obligation to succeed, and no articulated obligation to allow ci-
vilians to exit in the absence of an agreement.  
Ultimately, these provisions left the use of the starvation of civilians as a 
method of war very much intact.60 Indeed, the requirements were sufficiently 
lenient for the 1956 U.S. Army law of war field manual to replicate the High 
Command rule and some of the language of the earlier Lieber Code. It pro-
vides, 
 
It is within the discretion of the besieging commander whether he will per-
mit noncombatants to leave and under what conditions. Thus, if a com-
mander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants in order to lessen 
the logistical burden he has to bear, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, 
to drive them back, so as to hasten the surrender. Persons who attempt to 
leave or enter a besieged place without obtaining the necessary permission 
are liable to be fired upon, sent back, or detained.61 
 
This posture was not formally reversed until the Department of Defense 
(DoD) issued its Law of War Manual in 2015 (revised in 2016), recognizing 
the illegality of forcing the return of civilians to besieged areas as a matter of 
customary international law.62 The Manual derives this obligation from the 
general requirement to take precautionary measures to minimize civilian 
loss—a principle articulated in the 1977 update to Hague and Geneva law, 
the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.63 
 
60. British Foreign Minister Michael Stewart, on the issue of Nigeria’s policy of starving 
out the people (and insurgents) of Biafra: “We must accept that, in the whole history of 
warfare, any nation which has been in a position to starve its enemy out has done so.” 786 
Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (1969) col. 953. 
61. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 44 (1956).  
62. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL § 5.19.4.1 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MAN-
UAL].  
63. Id. § 5.19.4.1. See also HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUAR-
TERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 2-1-2 (2019). In Additional Protocol I, this 
principle is codified in Article 57(2)(a)(ii), which provides that parties are to “take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in 
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 













The amendment could equally have been rooted in a different rule de-
veloped in Additional Protocol I and its NIAC analogue, Additional Proto-
col II.64 The codification of these treaties marked the moment when IHL 
switched from a regime under which starvation was permitted with only very 
light regulation to one in which it was the subject of a relatively comprehen-
sive prohibition. The key IAC provision in Protocol I is Article 54, which is 
worth replicating in full here. It provides: 
 
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. 
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-
stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, live-
stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, 
for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to 
the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, 
whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, 
or for any other motive. 
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects 
covered by it as are used by an adverse Party: 
a. as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or 
b. if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, pro-
vided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects 
be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population 
with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or 
force its movement. 
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals. 
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in 
the defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from 
the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to 
the conflict within such territory under its own control where required 
by imperative military necessity.65 
 
 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(2)(a)(ii), June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter AP I]. Accepting the customary status of the prohibi-
tion of the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, see U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MAN-
UAL, supra note 62, § 5.20.1. 
64. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts art. 14, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 












Debates as to the scope and reach of this prohibition are addressed in Parts 
IV and V. However, on its face, it is a robust ban, particularly when com-
pared to the permissive regime that had preceded it. 
The most obvious gap in the prohibition is the so-called “scorched 
earth” exception in paragraph five, whereby a party can derogate from the 
ban in a context of defensive emergency. However, derogation of that kind 
is available only during a very short temporal window (in the face of invasion, 
but where the territory remains in the scorching party’s control), applies only 
to the destruction of objects indispensable to civilian survival on the scorch-
ing party’s own sovereign territory, and is tenable only to the extent such 
action is required by defensive necessity. These conditions, which evoke the 
similarly narrow levée en masse exception to the requirements of privileged bel-
ligerency, tightly limit the reach of the exception and render it entirely inap-
plicable to sieges and naval blockades.66 More significant, then, are the limits 
internal to the fundamental prohibition (as articulated in paragraphs one and 
two) and the core exceptions to it (as defined in paragraph three). These are 
discussed further in the ensuing Parts. 
The scorched-earth exception notwithstanding, there is no restriction on 
the class or nationality of civilians protected by Article 54. Relatedly, a pro-
posal by Pakistan to exclude a ban on starvation from Additional Protocol 
II on the grounds that it was inappropriate to limit the State’s use of such 
tactics in internal conflicts was unsuccessful.67 Article 14 of Additional Pro-
tocol II, which was ultimately adopted by consensus, provides that even in 
NIACs,  
 
Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore 
prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as 
 
66. On the levee en masse exception, see Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(6), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
GC III]. 
67. Pakistan Statement, Doc. CDDH/427 (May 31, 1977), 4 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF 
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974–
1977), at 87 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS] (noting that there are seventeen vol-












foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, live-
stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.68 
  
In contrast to the IAC provision, which includes exceptions in para-
graphs three and five, the ICRC Commentary describes Article 14 of Protocol 
II as “a rule from which no derogation may be made,” noting that a formu-
lation “whereby it would have been possible to make an exception in case of 
imperative military necessity was not adopted.”69 Derivative of that, the 
ICRC understands the customary starvation ban to be a rare instance in 
which the NIAC prohibition is more comprehensive than is its IAC coun-
terpart.70 
The key areas of interpretive debate of direct relevance to the issue of 
encirclement deprivation are addressed below. There are, however, two 
points of relatively broad interpretive consensus that are worth emphasizing 
before turning to the issue of humanitarian access. First, notwithstanding the 
ordinary meaning of the term, few understand the starvation ban to cover 
only the deprivation of food and water.71 Rather, the prohibition extends to 
the severe deprivation of any goods essential to human survival, including 
items such as medical supplies or clothing.72 Second, starvation is understood 
in law primarily as a process rather than an outcome.73 In other words, the 
deprivation of essential items in a context in which that deprivation threatens 
 
68. Reporting that the consensus adoption was grounded in humanitarian considera-
tions, see Federica D’Alessandra & Matthew Gillett, The War Crime of Starvation in Non-Inter-
national Armed Conflict, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 815, 819 (2019). 
69. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 4795 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). 
70. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 54 (Jean-Marie Hencka-
erts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1. 
71. For an exception, see Manuel J. Ventura, Prosecuting Starvation under International Crim-
inal Law: Exploring the Legal Possibilities, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
781, 789 (2019) (“The meaning of the word ‘starvation’ would be stretched beyond recog-
nition if it were to encompass a well-fed person that is deprived of clothing.”). 
72. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 740; Dapo Akande & Emanuela-Chiara 
Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity and the War Crime of Starvation of Civilians as a Method of 
Warfare: The Underlying Rules of International Humanitarian Law, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 753, 758–60 (2019); Knut Dörmann, War Crimes Under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of 
Crimes, 7 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 341, 388 (2003). 
73. On the distinction, see, e.g., Bridget Conley & Alex de Waal, The Purposes of Starva-












survival or impedes the capacity of persons to sustain life violates the star-
vation ban, whether or not victims die or suffer a particular level of malnour-
ishment as a result of that deprivation.74 
Supplementing this core prohibition are articles updating and revising 
the prior rules on humanitarian access to civilian populations in contexts 
other than belligerent occupation. Article 70 of Protocol I states that when 
the civilian population  
 
is not adequately provided with [food, medical supplies, clothing, bedding, 
means of shelter, and other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian 
population], relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in charac-
ter and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, sub-
ject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions.75 
 
It provides further that the parties to the conflict (and all other Additional 
Protocol I parties) “shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage 
of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance 
with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian popula-
tion of the adverse Party.”76 
The meaning of this provision, too, is debated, particularly with respect 
to the scope of State discretion in granting or denying consent to humani-
tarian offers. However, three significant shifts from Article 23 of Geneva 
Convention IV are immediately noticeable. First, Article 70 protects all civil-
ians, not just specific subcategories. Second, it protects a broader range of 
humanitarian relief—namely, all supplies essential to civilian survival. Third, 
the provision does not include the loopholes that so diminish the force of 
the obligation in Article 23 of Convention IV. Instead, a party granting hu-
manitarian access under Additional Protocol I is limited to imposing “tech-
nical arrangements, including search” and to making the passage of relief 
“conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the local 
supervision of a Protecting Power.”77 Article 71 allows only temporary re-
strictions to agreed relief in cases of “imperative military necessity.”78 
 
74. Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 760–61; Group of 
Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 741; International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes 
31, Doc. No. ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng (2011) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes]. 
75. AP I, supra note 63, art. 70(1). 
76. Id. art. 70(2). 
77. Id. art. 70(3). 












A final shift from Geneva Convention IV is worth noting briefly, alt-
hough it implicates a debate explicated below regarding the discretion to 
deny humanitarian access.79 Article 10 of Geneva Convention IV provides 
that the Convention presents “no obstacle to the humanitarian activities 
which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial 
humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the 
conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons and for 
their relief.”80 Article 70 of Additional Protocol I differs from that provision 
both in its greater detail, but also in providing that relief actions “shall be 
undertaken” subject to the parties’ agreement, rather than merely that they 
“may be undertaken” subject to that consent.81 Many take this subtle shift to 
indicate that State discretion regarding whether to allow humanitarian actors 
to access populations in need is limited in important respects.82 
Overall, the apparent tightening of the rules of humanitarian access in 
Additional Protocol I is sufficient for some to argue that the weaknesses of 
the Geneva IV rules on humanitarian access were “remedied to a large ex-
tent” by the 1977 treaty.83 With slightly different wording, Article 18 of Pro-
tocol II extends the same basic framework to NIACs, providing,  
 
If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the 
supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, 
relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively human-
itarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse 
distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Con-
tracting Party concerned.84 
 
Of course, a crucial question regarding rules of the Additional Protocols 
is whether they or some variation on them, have customary status for the 
 
79. See infra notes 203–211, 314–338 and accompanying text. 
80. GC IV, supra note 46, art. 10 (replicated for combatants rendered hors de combat by 
wounds, sickness, shipwreck, or detention in common Article 9 of Geneva Conventions I, 
II, and III). Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Con-
vention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; GC 
III, supra note 66, art. 9. 
81. AP I, supra note 63, art. 70 (emphasis added). 
82. See infra notes 315–338 and accompanying text. 
83. Jelena Pejic, The Right to Food in Situations of Armed Conflict: The Legal Framework, 83 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1097, 1103 (2011). 












small but militarily significant minority of States that have not ratified the 
treaties.85 In its landmark 2005 study of customary IHL, the ICRC found the 
relevant rules discussed above to be customarily binding on all States in both 
IACs and NIACs.86 Various commentators have advanced arguments in fa-
vor of that position.87 Some point to the consensus support for the starvation 
ban during Protocol I negotiations, including among those that did not go 
on to ratify the treaty as a whole.88 It is also notable that a wide range of 
States incorporate the ban the use of starvation as a method of warfare into 
their military manuals.89 Encirclements, such as blockades, have often in-
cluded humanitarian corridors of one form or another in the decades since 
the Protocols were negotiated.90 And on the occasions that starvation tactics 
have been used, they have been condemned.91 
At the level of State action through international organizations, the U.N. 
General Assembly has rejected the deprivation of food as an instrument of 
pressure and condemned starvation in armed conflict on numerous occa-
sions.92 The Security Council has similarly condemned the “denial of human-
itarian access,” identified “willfully impeding relief supply and access” as a 
 
85. Although one hundred and seventy-four States are bound by Protocol I in their 
mutual engagements, among the non-parties are a number of States that are of significant 
interest from a law of armed conflict perspective, including Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey, and the United States. In addition to lacking each of those States, 
Protocol II also lacks Iraq and Syria among its States parties. 
86. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 70, rr. 53–55. 
87. See, e.g., Provost, supra note 57, at 628–38; DAPO AKANDE & EMANUELA-CHIARA 
GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE ON THE LAW RELATING TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OP-
ERATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT 95–96, 136 n.105 (2016). But see Salvatore 
Zappala, Conflict Related Hunger, ‘Starvation Crimes’ and UN Security Council Resolution 2417, 17 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 881, 899 (2019).  
88. Provost, supra note 57, at 631. 
89. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 53 (Jean-Marie Hencka-
erts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/ 
docs/v2_rul_rule53. 
90. See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, ¶¶ 20, 26, MAX PLANCK ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oct. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/ 
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e252?rskey=6ktGAZ&re-
sult=1&prd=MPIL; Louise Doswald-Beck, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable 
to Armed Conflict at Sea, 35 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 583, 584 (1995). 
In some cases, the exceptions have been condemned as insufficient under existing custom-
ary law. See, e.g., Provost, supra note 57, at 638. 
91. D'Alessandra & Gillett, supra note 68, at 823; Provost, supra note 57, at 634.  
92. For just a few examples over time, see, e.g., G.A. Res. 185 (Dec. 17, 1981); G.A. Res. 












violation of IHL, and classified starvation as a threat to international peace 
and security that warrants outside intervention.93 In 2018, the Council ap-
proved unanimously a resolution stating that it “strongly condemns the un-
lawful denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indis-
pensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supply and ac-
cess for responses to conflict-induced food insecurity in situations of armed 
conflict,” noting that such actions “may constitute a violation of interna-
tional humanitarian law.”94 It further noted that the starvation of civilians as 
a method of warfare might constitute a war crime.95 
As a non-party to the Protocols, it is notable that Israel’s government 
and High Court of Justice have relied on the customary status of the rules 
articulated in Articles 54 and 70 of Additional Protocol I to evaluate and 
permit (controversially) the State’s actions in controlling the fuel and elec-
tricity supply into Gaza.96 Similarly, despite U.S. objections to the method-
ology of the ICRC study,97 the country’s Law of War Manual recognizes the 
prohibition of starvation as a customary rule and clarifies (as noted above) 
that it understands the forced return of fleeing civilians back into a besieged 
area of starving people to be a violation of international law.98 The Manual is 
more equivocal on whether “all of [the] particulars” of Article 54 of Protocol 
I reflect customary international law, but it accepts the core ban.99 
On the issue of humanitarian relief, it is interesting that the U.S. DoD 
Law of War Manual focuses exclusively on the framework provided in Article 
23 of Geneva Convention IV.100 In contrast to many other provisions of the 
First Protocol, the customary credentials of which are either affirmed or re-
jected explicitly, Article 70 of Protocol I is not referenced directly a single 
 
93. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 25, 2014); S.C. Res. 733 (Jan. 23, 1992); S.C. Res. 761 
(June 21, 1992). 
94. S.C. Res 2417, ¶ 6 (May 24, 2018). 
95. Id. pmbl. 
96. HCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed and others v. Prime Minister and Minister 
of Defence ¶¶ 13–22 (2008), http://www.hamoked.org/items/9862_eng.pdf (unofficial 
translation) (Isr.). 
97. John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007). 
98. U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, § 5.20. 
99. Id. § 5.20.4. 












time in the Manual. 101 In a prior review of Additional Protocol I by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Article 70 was deemed acceptable only subject to the caveat 
that humanitarian access could be denied on the grounds of “imperative con-
siderations of military necessity,” to preclude a “radical, if perhaps unin-
tended, change in the customary law of siege and blockade warfare, which 
has always allowed the besieging and blockading power to cut off all supplies 
going to areas of enemy control.”102 This issue is addressed further in the 
ensuing Parts. 
A final development relevant both on its own terms as an additional fea-
ture of the starvation ban and in its implications for the customary status of 
the rules articulated in the Additional Protocols today is the criminalization 
of starvation as a method of warfare. Developments here postdate the pub-
lication of the San Remo Manual, and so are of particular relevance to the 
latter’s revision. 
The ban on starvation as a method of warfare was omitted from the 
grave breaches provision of Additional Protocol I and absent from the stat-
utes and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.103 As at Nuremberg, and despite the scale of the deprivations in-
flicted in the sieges of Sarajevo and Srebrenica, starvation was prosecuted 
before the tribunals only when inflicted on detainees.104 In line with that 
trend, neither of the International Law Commission’s 1994 and 1996 drafts 
 
101. There is a single indirect reference to Article 70 in the Manual as a whole, which 
occurs in a quote from a speech by a former Deputy Legal Adviser in a footnote that refer-
ences that quote for its position on Article 54 (also mentioned), not Article 70. Id. at 317 
n.724. 
102. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Review of the 1977 First Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, at 72–73, to Secretary of Defense (May 3, 
1985), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/ 
Joint_Staff/1985_JCSM_152-85_Review_of_GC_AP_I.pdf  
103. AP I, supra note 63, art. 85. 
104. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1029, 1204, 
1207, 1232, 1252, 1265, 1291, 1303–7, 3232, 3287–99, 3306, 3312, 3450–55 (Int’l Crim. for 
the former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 2017). On the starvation conditions in Srebrenica and Sa-
rajevo, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 2330–36, 2389, 4557, 4599–606, 4845; Final Report of the Commis-
sion of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1994), transmitted 
by Letter dated May 27, 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 












of an international criminal code for a permanent court address the issue of 
starvation as a method of warfare.105 
At this point, however, things began to change. In 1995, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly provided for a Preparatory Committee, open to all States, to 
establish what would become the International Criminal Court (ICC).106 
Shortly after the International Law Commission released its 1996 draft, the 
Preparatory Committee published its first compilation of proposals. Among 
them was “starving of the civilian population and prevention of humanitar-
ian assistance from reaching them.”107 The Preparatory Committee proposals 
went through several iterations before developing into the Rome Statute of 
today. During that process, a NIAC version of the crime was proposed.108 
However, it was dropped during final negotiations for reasons that remain 
hazy even for those who were at the Rome Conference, except to say that 
there was a general wariness of an excessive expansion of the war crimes 
code in NIACs.109 Rogier Bartels suggests the omission of the NIAC war 
 
105. International Law Commission, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute 
for an International Criminal Court, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.491/Rev.2 (1994); Interna-
tional Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/51/10, at 15 (1996) (Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
with commentaries). The only mention of starvation in the Commission’s commentaries is 
through the use of detainee starvation as an example to illuminate the concept of superior 
responsibility. Id. at 25 (“A military commander contributes directly to the commission of a 
crime when he orders his subordinate to carry out a criminal act, such as killing an unarmed 
civilian, or to refrain from performing an act which the subordinate has a duty to perform, 
such as refraining from providing food for prisoners of war which results in their starva-
tion.”) 
106. G.A. Res. 50/46, Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Dec. 11, 
1995). 
107. Michael Cottier & Emilia Richard, Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), in THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 508, 510 (Otto Triffterer & Kai 
Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016); 2 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/51/22, at 61 (Compilation of Proposals), 
(1996). 
108. Rogier Bartels, Denying Humanitarian Access as an International Crime in Times of Non-
International Armed Conflict: The Challenges to Prosecute and Some Proposals for the Future, 48 ISRAEL 
LAW REVIEW 281, 297–98 (2015). 
109. Panel on Starvation in Armed Conflicts (panelists: Federica D’Alessandra, Brian 
Lander, Matthias Lanz, and Charles Garraway), Geneva Academy (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmg7kAB27Qg. Charles Garraway, who was at the 
Rome Conference, “my own belief is it fell just below the threshold, bearing in mind there 
were still States in Rome who were not prepared to accept any, any offenses [in NIACs] 













crime was “an oversight, perhaps caused by the unfortunate placing of the 
proposed crime together with various versions of disproportionate use of 
force,” which were dropped due to the absence of proportionality from Ad-
ditional Protocol II (an absence that was, of course, not replicated in the case 
of starvation and humanitarian access).110 
The finally agreed IAC provision criminalizes “intentionally using star-
vation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects in-
dispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as 
provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”111 The provision has yet to be 
invoked or interpreted by any ICC authority, although this hardly makes it 
unique among Rome Statute provisions. In December 2019, following sig-
nificant political mobilization, the Court’s Assembly of States Parties ap-
proved an amendment extending the war crime to NIACs, replicating the 
language of the IAC crime, except for the reference to the Geneva Conven-
tions.112 The Assembly was unanimous in approving the amendment, but the 
longer and more arduous task of ratification remains.113 
The criminalization of starvation in the Rome Statute has been catalytic. 
Many States that are party to the ICC system replicate the Rome Statute 
framework in their domestic war crimes codes. For that reason, it is unsur-
prising that thus far, many States have incorporated only the IAC war 
 
in preparation for the 2018 Swiss proposal, “you find . . . no real information in the travaux 
préparatoires on why this happened, so I think . . . it was chaotic and there was a lot of 
politics involved is probably what comes closest to the truth. . . . We believe that [the NIAC 
draft provision] was [deleted from what became the final Statute as] part of a bigger package 
where tradeoffs were made.” Id. at 36:18. See also Cottier & Richard, supra note 107, at 510; 
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 285 
(5th ed. 2017). 
110. Bartels, supra note 108, at 298. 
111. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. (last amended November 29, 2010, depository notification 
C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8) [hereinafter ICC Statute].  
112. Report of the Working Group on Amendments, Assembly of States Parties, Doc. 
No. ICC-ASP/18/32, app. I, art. 8(2)(e)(xix) (Dec. 3, 2019). The amendment had been pro-
posed by Switzerland in a non-paper. Report of the Working Group on Amendments, As-
sembly of States Parties, Doc. No. ICC-ASP/17/35, annex IV (Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter 
Switzerland Non-paper]. 
113. In accordance with the Rome Statute’s amendment regime, the new provision will 
enter into force only for States Parties that go on to ratify it. ICC Statute, supra note 111, 
art. 121(5). At the time of publication, three States have ratified the amendment: Andorra, 












crime.114 Those hybrid tribunals that have replicated the ICC’s war crimes 
code have also included an IAC war crime of starvation as a method of war-
fare.115 More expansively, the (as yet not in force) Malabo Protocol for a 
supranational criminal justice chamber in the African Union system, the 
Group of Experts on Yemen, the Commission on Human Rights in South 
Sudan, and many States in their domestic criminal codes recognized starva-
tion as a customary war crime with applicability in both IACs and NIACs 
before that change was made at the ICC.116 The Commission on Human 
Rights in South Sudan has also advocated the incorporation of the NIAC 
starvation crime into the statute of the promised Hybrid Court for South 
 
114. Based on a search of the ICC legal tools database (legal-tools.org), and the ICRC’s 
customary IHL study. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, 
r. 53, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule53. States that 
have criminalized starvation as a method of warfare in IACs, but not NIACS (often due to 
a straight transposition of the ICC Statute provisions) include Australia, Burundi, Canada, 
Congo, France, Georgia, Ireland, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, New Zea-
land, Samoa, Slovenia, South Africa, Timor-Leste, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United 
Kingdom. 
115. United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/15, 
On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction of Serious Criminal Offenses 
art. 6(1)(b)(xxv), June 6, 2000, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/ 
etimor/untaetR/Reg0015E.pdf; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 13(b)(xxv), Dec. 
10, 2003, reprinted in 43 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 231 (2004); Law No. 05/L-053 
on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office art. 14(1)(b)(xxv), Kosovo, 
Aug. 3, 2015, https://www.scp-ks.org/en/documents/law-specialist-chambers-and-spe-
cialist-prosecutors-office. 
116. Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights annex, arts. 28D(b)(xxvi), 28D(e)(xvi), June 27, 2014, A.U. Doc. 
No. STC/Legal/Min/7(l) Rev. l; Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 748; Com-
mission on Human Rights in South Sudan, “There is nothing left for us”: Starvation as a Method 
of Warfare in South Sudan, ¶¶ 35–38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/45/CRP.3 (Oct. 5, 2020) [hereinaf-
ter Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan]. Based on a search of the ICC legal tools 
database (legal-tools.org), and the ICRC’s customary IHL study. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, r. 53, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/custom-
ary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule53. States codifying starvation as a war crime, regardless of 
conflict classification, include Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ethiopia, Norway, 
Rwanda, and Spain. States that provide explicitly that starvation can be perpetrated in a 
NIAC, include Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Germany, Kosovo, the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, 
Philippines, South Korea, Switzerland, and Uruguay. See also D’Alessandra & Gillett, supra 













Sudan.117 Cases remain few and far between, but the legislative trajectory is 
clear.118 
The significance of these developments is not limited to war crimes law. 
The ICC starvation crimes are enshrined in the Rome Statute as “serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in [IACs or NIACs, respec-
tively], within the established framework of international law.”119 This lan-
guage reflects a broader principle that the status of a particular act as a war 
crime depends on the prohibition of that action as a matter of IHL.120 There 
are currently 123 States parties to the ICC. Two additional States were parties 
before withdrawing for reasons unrelated to the starvation crime.121 Each of 
those 125 States, through ratification or accession, affirmed that the war 
crime of starvation as a method of warfare is rooted in an underlying IHL 
prohibition—one that applies without difficulty to the nationals of non-party 
States when they act on the territory of ICC States parties. Three of those 
States are not themselves party to the Additional Protocols.122 At least three 
additional States that have recognized the war crime status of the practice in 
their domestic codes are party to neither the Protocols nor the Rome Stat-
ute.123 Each lends additional support to the principle that starvation as a 
method of warfare is both illegal as a matter of customary IHL and a war 
crime for which individuals may be held accountable under international law. 
 
 
117. Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, supra note 116, ¶¶ 43, 148(e). The 
Court is provided for in the Revitalised Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South 
Sudan, Sept. 12, 2018, https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2112. 
118. The two exceptions typically invoked here are Public Prosecutor v. M.P. et al. and 
Special Prosecutor v. Col. Mengistu Hailamariam et al. Public Prosecutor v. M.P. et al., Case 
No. K. 74/96, Verdict (District Ct. Zadar, Croatia Apr. 24, 1997), http://www.interna-
tionalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1053; Special Prosecutor v. Col. Mengistu Hailamariam et 
al., Criminal File No. 1/87, Judgment ( Ethiopian Federal High Court Dec. 12, 2006). 
119. ICC Statute, supra note 111, arts. 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e) (emphasis added). 
120. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić Interlocutory Appeal]; Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food In-
security, supra note 72, at 755. 
121.Agence France-Presse, Burundi Becomes First Nation to Leave International Criminal 
Court, GUARDIAN, (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/ 
burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-criminal-court; Duterte’s Statement on In-
ternational Criminal Court Withdrawal, RAPPLER.COM (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.rap-
pler.com/nation/198171-full-text-philippines-rodrigo-duterte-statement-international-
criminal-court-withdrawal. 
122. Andorra, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands. 












III. THE SAN REMO MANUAL AND ITS  
        HUMANITARIAN VULNERABILITIES 
 
The core form of comprehensive encirclement deprivation in naval warfare 
is the blockade. It is unsurprising, then, that the San Remo Manual addresses 
the issues of starvation and humanitarian access in its blockade law frame-
work. More surprising is the exclusivity of that incorporation. Whereas the 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare includes both 
generally applicable provisions on starvation and humanitarian access and 
specific starvation rules within the framework governing air blockades,124 the 
San Remo Manual does not address the issues of starvation or humanitarian 
access outside of the blockade context.125 This is a significant omission. Se-
vere deprivations can be inflicted on the civilian population via forms of 
naval warfare (and even naval encirclement) that do not qualify as blockades 
in the technical sense.126 Indeed, questions have been raised about whether 
the law of blockade applies to the two most heavily scrutinized naval encir-
clement and deprivation operations in recent years—Israel on Gaza and the 
Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition on Yemen.127 Whatever one makes of the 
status of those specific actions, it is remarkable both that the Manual is silent 
on the issue of starvation via naval methods other than blockade and that 
there is no explanation for that silence. The issue is particularly pertinent in 
NIACs, given that, on the dominant view, “blockade is a method of warfare 
recognized to apply in international armed conflicts only.”128 But put that 
issue to one side. The deeper point of concern is that the San Remo blockade 
regime itself has significant humanitarian infirmities. 
Having affirmed and clarified the customary status of the longstanding 
London Declaration rules on efficacy, publicity, specificity, universality, and 
 
124. The HPCR Manual more or less replicates the San Remo Manual on the law of 
blockade (with the small deviation noted below). HPCR MANUAL, supra note 11, rr. 157–
59. However, it also provides general starvation rules. Id. rr. 97, 100–4.  
125. Apart from the provisions on blockade, the only other rules of the San Remo Man-
ual that are somewhat relevant are those protecting vessels engaged in humanitarian relief 
or carrying supplies to the survival of the civilian population from attack or capture. SRM, 
supra note 10, rr. 47, 136, 150. 
126. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 90, ¶ 57; Wolff Heintschel von Hei-
negg, Blockades and Interdictions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 925, 927 (Marc Weller ed. 2015). 
127. See infra note 386. 
128. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdictions, supra note 126, ¶ 25. Cf. infra 












respect for neutral States,129 the Manual’s key modernizing step was to intro-
duce constraints relating to starvation and the deprivation of essential items 
into both the test for the legality of imposing a blockade (in paragraph 102) 
and the rules for managing a blockade once imposed (in paragraphs 103–4). 
These provisions represent the drafters’ effort to incorporate the develop-
ments discussed in the previous Part. Indeed, the San Remo Explanation 
describes these rules as “affected by” and “drawn from” the Protocol I rules 
banning starvation and governing humanitarian access.130 
 
A. Prohibited Blockades 
 
The Manual identifies two kinds of prohibited blockade. Pursuant to para-
graph 102(a), it is illegal to declare or establish a blockade that “has the sole 
purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essen-
tial for its survival.”131 Irrespective of the operation’s purpose, paragraph 
102(b) prohibits establishing or declaring a blockade in a context in which 
“the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the 
blockade.”132 These rules have been cited heavily in analyses of Israel’s block-
ade of Gaza.133 They are replicated with a small (though not insignificant) 
 
129. Namely: efficacy, declaration and notification, specification of temporal and geo-
graphic scope (as well as the time for neutral States’ vessels to leave), non-restriction of 
access to neutral States’ ports or coasts, impartiality with respect to vessels of all States, and 
proper declaration, notification, and specification of cessation, temporary lifting, re-estab-
lishment, extension, or other alteration. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 93–101. 
130. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 102.1, 103.1. 
131. Id. ¶ 102(a). 
132. Id. ¶ 102(b). 
133. Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of In-
ternational Law, Including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting 
from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, ¶ 50, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/21 (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hr 
council/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.pdf [hereinafter International Fact-Finding Mis-
sion]; Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Inci-
dent, ¶ 157 (Sept. 2011), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ 
Full_Report_2235.pdf [hereinafter Palmer Report]; 1 JACOB TURKEL ET AL., THE PUBLIC 
COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010, ¶ 61 (2011), 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_ 












change in the HPCR Manual on air and missile warfare.134 They are refer-
enced frequently in scholarly work and military manuals.135 And yet, the con-
straints they impose are anemic. 
In prohibiting only blockades with the sole purpose of starving the civil-
ian population or depriving it of objects indispensable for its survival, sub-
paragraph 102(a) sets the subjective threshold for State breach higher even 
than that required to establish direct individual criminal responsibility for 
genocide. For the latter, it is sufficient to show that the special genocidal 
intent (acting with a view to destroying a protected group in whole or in part) 
was one of the purposes driving an individual’s wrongful conduct.136 For the 
former, the starvation of the civilian population must be the sole purpose of 
the State action; even a blockade with the clear primary purpose of starving 
or depriving civilians of essentials would avoid violating 102(a), as long as at 
least one other secondary purpose could be established.137 Thus, for example, 
even if one were to hold that the blockade of Yemen sought at various points 
to starve the civilian population as a method of warfare,138 it would be 
enough to avoid violating 102(a) to show that the encirclement also sought 
to guarantee that supplies to enemy fighters were cut off completely or that 
enemy fighters were starved, or to divert the attention and resources of the 
blockaded adversary away from military projects.139 
It is difficult to imagine a blockade that would fail the sole purpose test. 
It is even harder to imagine a blockade that could not be defended success-
fully against an allegation to that effect. Establishing a breach would require 
not just proving the existence of the wrongful purpose (itself a difficult task 
 
134. HPCR MANUAL, supra note 11, r. 157. But note infra note 137. 
135. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 90, ¶ 51; 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATI-
ONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 70, r. 53. 
136. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 53 (July 
9, 2004) (establishing genocide requires only that “the proscribed acts were committed 
against the victims because of their membership in the protected group, but not solely because 
of such membership”). 
137 Note the not insignificant shift in the HPCR Manual, which prohibits aerial block-
ades with the “sole or primary purpose” of starving civilians. HPCR MANUAL, supra note 11, 
r. 157(a) (emphasis added). 
138. Along these lines, see Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, ¶ 190, U.N. 
Doc. S/2018/594 (Jan. 26, 2018) (“The blockade is essentially using the threat of starvation 
as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war.”). 
139. Cf. Palmer Report, supra note 133, ¶ 77 (“it is evident that Israel had a military 
objective. The stated primary objective of the naval blockade was for security”). See also id. 












at the best of times),140 but also proving the absence of any other purpose. 
Conversely, all that would be needed to defend against such a charge would 
be a plausible claim to at least one additional secondary purpose. The range 
of realistic scenarios in which such a legal defense would not be viable is 
sufficiently barren to render the rule in paragraph 102(a) a practical nullity. 
Given that implication, the San Remo Explanation is strikingly laconic 
in accounting for the use of “sole” in 102(a). The Explanation simply indi-
cates that the humanitarian protections provided in 102(b), 103, and 104 reg-
ulate blockades not driven by the sole purpose of starving civilians.141 The 
mere fact of other rules, however, does not make sense of framing the pri-
mary prohibition so narrowly as to render it meaningless, particularly in the 
absence of any clear legal basis for that narrow framing.142 
The consequence of recognizing paragraph 102(a) to be a practical nullity 
is that paragraph 102(b) becomes the Manual’s only functional humanitarian 
prohibition on imposing a blockade. It prohibits blockades expected to cause 
damage to the civilian population that is excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated. This draws directly on the language 
used to articulate the standard proportionality rule for attacks in Additional 
Protocol I.143 Issues arise here concerning both the basis for this provision 
and its utility as a source of human protection. 
Strikingly the Explanation says nothing about the basis for including a 
proportionality rule here, other than to note that it covers the gaps left by 
102(a) regarding blockades that are not directed exclusively at starving the 
civilian population.144 One explanation would be that the Manual considers 
the blockade to be a form of “attack,” such that jus in bello proportionality 
would apply as a matter of course.145 Whether or not such an interpretation 
 
140. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 40 
(July 7, 2006). 
141. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 102.2–102.4. 
142. Certainly, it is not derived from the rules on starvation in the Additional Protocols. 
Cf. supra note 64. 
143. AP I, supra note 63, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).  
144. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 102.4. 
145. On the notion that deprivation by encirclement (whether siege or blockade) may 
qualify as attacks, see Gloria Gaggioli, Joint Blog Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: 
Are Sieges Prohibited under Contemporary IHL?, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/joint-blog-series-on-international-law-and-armed-conflict-are-
sieges-prohibited-under-contemporary-ihl/; Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Sieges, The Law Pro-













could be reconciled with the Protocol I definition of an “attack” as an “act[] 
of violence against the adversary,” such an approach would seem to raise 
issues of consistency internal to the San Remo Manual itself. 146 The Manual 
includes a general proportionality rule for attacks in paragraph 46(d), along-
side several other rules for the protection of civilians in the course of attacks 
that are not replicated in the blockade provisions.147 If the assumption under-
pinning the Manual is that blockades are attacks, this is a puzzling asymmetry. 
Alternatively, one might reason that proportionality is a general principle 
of IHL applicable to all methods of warfare, whether or not they qualify as 
“attacks” in the technical sense.148 If that is the Manual’s position, it is suffi-
ciently important to warrant express articulation and justification. It would 
also raise questions regarding what distinguishes proportionality from other 
core targeting rules that might also be thought to be general principles of 
IHL, but which do not find direct articulation in the Manual’s blockade rules. 
The principle of distinction, for example, may have an even stronger claim 
to being a general principle of IHL than does proportionality, and yet it finds 
only partial incorporation in paragraph 102(a).149 Whatever the explanation 
for the role of proportionality in 102(b), it is remarkable that the commentary 
declines to offer it. And yet, the uncertainty of its basis notwithstanding, it is 
also clear that the Manual’s invocation of proportionality has resonated in the 
interpretations and approaches of subsequent authorities.150 
 
ians (drawing on the standard articulated for cyber operations in the Tallinn Manual). TAL-
LINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, r. 92. Others have advocated a similarly broad understand-
ing of “attack” in the contexts of cyber-warfare and cultural property protections. ICRC 
EXPERT MEETING, THE POTENTIAL HUMAN COST OF CYBER OPERATIONS, at 72–73 
(Nov. 14–16, 2018), https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/97346/the-potential-hu-
man-cost-of-cyber-operations.pdf; Eian Katz, Milena Sterio & Jonathan Worboys, “At-
tacks” Against Hospitals and Cultural Property: Broad in Time, Broad in Substance, ARTICLES OF 
WAR (Nov. 17, 2020), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/attacks-against-hospitals-cultural-prop-
erty-broad/. 
146. AP I, supra note 63, art. 49(1).  
147. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 46(d). See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. 
148. Jan Kleffner, Military Collaterals and Ius in Bello Proportionality, 48 ISRAEL YEAR-
BOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (2018). 
149. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 12 (3d ed. 2016). 
150. See, e.g., TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 88; Report of the Com-
mission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1, at 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (Nov. 23, 2006); 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 













Justification for its inclusion aside, the key substantive question regard-
ing 102(b) is whether the proportionality principle introduces practically sig-
nificant humanitarian limits into the law of blockade. There are three reasons 
to be skeptical of the presumption that it does. First, even in the contexts 
most hospitable to it, proportionality analysis suffers from systematic defi-
ciencies relating to uncertainty, ambiguity, and subjectivity. Second, the par-
allel rules that mitigate those deficiencies in the targeting context are not 
incorporated into the San Remo framework for blockades. Third, the defi-
ciencies of the proportionality rule in targeting are amplified when trans-
posed to blockades, due to the scope and duration of the latter. Consider 
these in turn. 
IHL proportionality is famously complicated to apply, even in standard 
targeting cases.151 Challenges of ex ante measurement in contexts of uncer-
tainty are layered onto the difficulty of aggregating across forms of civilian 
loss or military advantage, and debates about who and what counts and on 
what time horizon. More fundamentally, even when there is agreement about 
what counts in the calculation of civilian loss expected and military advantage 
anticipated, the process of evaluating those qualitatively different values in 
relation to one another is hamstrung by the lack of a universally accepted 
exchange rate or other basis for comparison. 
Some of these complications are mitigated in the targeting context. Pro-
portionality calculations are ordinarily part of an interdependent framework 
of targeting restrictions, including the rules of distinction, discrimination, 
and precautions. In a standard attack, the question of whether civilian loss is 
excessive in relation to military advantage arises only if the civilians were not 
the target, the attack was targeted exclusively against a discrete military ob-
jective, and all feasible precautions were taken to verify the relevant infor-
mation and to ensure that the collateral civilian loss was avoided, or at least 
minimized. Put another way, proportionality ordinarily comes at the end of 
a decision tree that has multiple prior junctures at which civilian-protecting 
rules may preclude the attack irrespective of how the military advantage an-
ticipated compares to the civilian loss expected. 
 
151. See, e.g., Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 48–50, 39 IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1257 (2000); Janina Dill, Assessing Proportionality, INTER-













The San Remo Manual, however, does not appear to extend that broader 
framework to blockades. It includes distinction, discrimination, proportion-
ality, and precautions in its basic rules on the conduct of hostilities.152 How-
ever, whereas proportionality is replicated in the specific regime for block-
ades, the other restrictions are not, except in the specific and limited forms 
of paragraphs 103 and 104 (discussed below), relating to certain aspects of 
minimizing civilian damage, and paragraph 102(a), with its extremely narrow 
prohibition on blockades implemented with the sole purpose of starving the 
civilian population. Interpreted in light of the principle expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius, the San Remo position appears to be that blockades are not 
restricted by the general rules of distinction, discrimination, or general pre-
cautions.153 If that reading of the Manual is incorrect, the application of those 
principles to blockades should be clarified in the revision; the implications 
would be profound.154 
Assuming that the Manual’s rules on blockades are indeed exclusive, the 
combination of the nullity of 102(a) and the lack of a broader framework of 
complementary protections places enormous functional pressure on the ca-
pacity of proportionality to operate as an isolated and yet effective humani-
tarian constraint. The difficulty, however, is that proportionality’s ordinary 
weaknesses in that regard are exacerbated by the nature of blockades. Tar-
geting operations tend to be short in duration and scope, allowing for a rel-
atively clear sense of the likely civilian loss and likely military advantage, with 
a contained degree of uncertainty in either direction. Such operations also 
occur sufficiently frequently to enable the iterated development of rough 
norms regarding what constitutes excessive loss in relation to what kind of 
anticipated advantage. Blockades do not fit that model. They are relatively 
rare and they can affect the entire population of the blockaded country or 
area for months or years. Moreover, their effects intersect with numerous 
other factors that will only become clear over time, including the policies of 
the encircled authority, environmental and climatic events, and population 
 
152. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 38–46. 
153. Id. ¶ 102.4 indicates that paragraph 102(b) covers proportionality and precautions, 
but this appears to conflate the rules, as 102(b) includes none of the elements of IHL pre-
cautions. 
154. Supporting such a reading of the applicability of some of the general principles, 
one might point (for example) to paragraph 42, which forbids the employment of any 
“methods or means of warfare” which are indiscriminate. Blockades are clearly a method of 












movements.155 All of this makes it far harder to evaluate with any precision 
the civilian loss expected or the military advantage anticipated from an en-
circlement method. 
Even assuming that this epistemic challenge were overcome in a given 
case, the extraordinary scale of both the civilian loss expected in a blockade 
(including, potentially, mass starvation) and the military advantage antici-
pated from it (including, potentially, total victory in the war) would bear no 
relation to the scale of those factors in ordinary targeting operations, where 
iterated practice has arguably established some rough sense of how to ap-
praise these values in relation to one another.156 This is not to deny that var-
ious authorities have made, and will continue to make, assertions regarding 
whether a particular blockade is or is not proportionate in the civilian harm 
it inflicts. It is instead to call into question the degree to which such asser-
tions are likely to garner the kind of consensus that would help to settle dis-
putes.157 
There is also a deeper normative question arising from the extended du-
ration of blockades. How, if at all, should losses and damage already inflicted 
be incorporated into a proportionality assessment regarding whether to con-
tinue a blockade? The question becomes particularly pointed when that con-
tinuation would mean extending the encirclement beyond the point at which 
 
155. In the context of the Gaza blockade, disagreements have arisen even with respect 
to the question of whether to consider the blockade in isolation from or together with the 
Israeli closure of land access to the Gaza Strip. Russell Buchan, The Palmer Report and the 
Legality of Israel’s Naval Blockade of Gaza, 61 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY 264, 270–71 (2012); Magne Frostad, Naval Blockade, 9 ARCTIC REVIEW ON LAW 
AND POLITICS 195, 210 (2018); Palmer Report, supra note 133, ¶¶ 78–79. 
156. For a relatively sanguine view of the determinacy of proportionality in ordinary 
operations, see EMANUELA-CHIARA GILLARD, PROPORTIONALITY IN THE CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES: THE INCIDENTAL HARM SIDE OF THE ASSESSMENT ¶ 81 (Dec. 2018). Provid-
ing reasons for skepticism that proportionality can provide a clear restraint in even tradi-
tional targeting contexts, see Janina Dill, Assessing Proportionality: An Unreasonable Demand on 
the Reasonable Commander?, INTERCROSS (Oct. 11, 2016), https://intercrossblog.icrc.org/ 
blog/r19aesa7v1kylcc5a4hbcwvfx8imus. 
157. The issue of proportionality has come up in the context of the Gaza blockade, 
with divergent results. For finding the blockade compliant with proportionality, see TURKEL 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶¶ 88–96; Palmer Report, supra note 133, ¶¶ 78–81. 
For finding the blockade to violate proportionality, see International Fact-Finding Mission, 
supra note 133, ¶¶ 51–54; TURKISH NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT ON THE 
ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY TO GAZA ON 31 MAY 2010, at 68–













success was anticipated in the original assessment.158 One approach would 
consider past civilian casualties to be a form of sunk cost, such that a pro-
portionality assessment regarding whether to continue would look only at 
future projected damage and advantage—what Seth Lazar calls the “pro-
spective view.”159 Another would deem the action (such as a blockade) dis-
proportionate once it exceeds the civilian damage deemed disproportionate 
at the start of the operation, irrespective of whether continuing now would 
promise an advantage that far outweighs the civilian loss that is likely to be 
incurred going forward—what Lazar calls the “quota view.”160 Lazar’s pre-
ferred third alternative—the “discount view”—would discount progres-
sively (and asymptotically towards a lower limit) the weight of the legitimate 
reasons for continuing with the operation as the costs incurred rack up over 
time.161 Fundamentally, it is simply not clear as a matter of law how the pro-
portionality of long-term and uncertain operations of this kind should be 
assessed. Although this complication can come up in the context of propor-
tionality in targeting, it features systematically in jus ad bellum proportionality 
and in what Noam Lubell and Amichai Cohen have identified recently as 
“strategic proportionality” issues in the jus in bello, including those arising in 
a blockade.162 The lack of clarity on how to understand proportionality here 
adds further to the layers of ambiguity discussed above. 
Ultimately, although there is procedural value in having decision makers 
confront the tradeoff between civilian loss and military advantage, the range 
of internal, structural, and contextual infirmities in the 102(b) rule are such 
that it is unlikely to do much to constrain the imposition of severe starvation 
conditions in a siege or blockade. Certainly, the heightened indeterminacy of 
the proportionality test in such situations weakens the capacity of the test to 
provide the focal point for mobilizing the political will necessary to confront 
a bad faith actor. As Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg puts it, proportionality 
in this context “will only in exceptional cases result in a generally accepted 
legal evaluation.”163 The force of humanitarian protection in the San Remo 
framework thus shifts from the rules defining when it is lawful to impose a 
blockade to those defining the lawful management of a blockade. 
 
158. TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 96. 
159. Seth Lazar, Moral Sunk Costs, 68 PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 844 (2018). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 848. 
162. Noam Lubell & Amichai Cohen, Strategic Proportionality: Limitations on the Use of Force 
in Modern Armed Conflicts, 96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 159 (2020). 












B. Humanitarian Constraints on the Management of Blockades 
 
In the latter category, paragraph 103 of the Manual provides that if the civil-
ian population of the blockaded territory is inadequately supplied with food 
and other essential objects, the blockading party “must provide for free pas-
sage of such foodstuffs and other essential supplies,”164 subject to the right 
to prescribe technical arrangements, including search, and to require that the 
distribution will occur under the supervision of a Protecting Power or an 
impartial humanitarian organization. Paragraph 104 provides that the block-
ading party “shall allow the passage of medical supplies for the civilian pop-
ulation or for the wounded and sick members of armed forces,”165 subject to 
its right to prescribe technical arrangements, including search. 
These rules avoid both the eviscerating narrowness of paragraph 102(a) 
and the multilayered ambiguity of paragraph 102(b). Moreover, in contrast 
to some interpretations of Article 70 of Additional Protocol I, they deny the 
blockading party any discretion to refuse access when the encircled popula-
tion is inadequately supplied.166 Indeed, the authors of the Explanation extol 
paragraph 103 as a humanitarian advance on the treaty rule for precisely that 
reason.167 One might even think that the requirements of paragraphs 103–4 
of the Manual would preclude the infliction of starvation as the effect of a 
blockade, thereby safeguarding the civilian population from the permissive-
ness of paragraph 102.168 
However, the shift from rules prohibiting the imposition or continuation 
of a blockade to rules regulating its management is significant. Even a block-
ade with humanitarian exceptions can cause mass starvation. Blockades deter 
market supply. Technical arrangements such as inspections increase signifi-
cantly the price of those goods that make it through, just as the broader 
economic consequences of being cut off from the outside send entire pop-
ulations into extreme poverty. Humanitarian relief is rarely sufficient to fill 
the gap. It is for these reasons that the Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade of 
 
164. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 103. 
165. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 104. 
166. See infra notes 205–211 and accompanying text. 
167. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 103.1–103.2. 
168. For a related interpretation of Additional Protocol I, see, e.g., Gillard, supra note 
145, at 11 (“Whatever position is adopted with regard to the scope of the prohibition of 













Yemen has brought the civilian population to the brink of famine, despite 
allowing the passage of food.169 
Such mass starvation does not occur by surprise. It is a process that be-
comes increasingly obvious over time.170 As Conley and de Waal put it, “No 
modern famine has unfolded in silence.”171 Whatever the uncertainty regard-
ing consequences at the beginning, at a certain point, continuing to impose 
a blockade entails inflicting starvation with near certainty. And yet, as long 
as there is a process for allowing essential objects through, this result could 
be accepted and even intended as a core purpose without falling afoul of the 
San Remo framework. 
Further infirmities arise due to ambiguities regarding the implications of 
the blockading party’s right to impose technical arrangements when allowing 
the passage of relief supplies. Although similar issues arise in Articles 70 and 
71 of Additional Protocol I, the problems may be particularly acute in the 
San Remo context, due to the aforementioned weakness of the prohibitions 
in paragraph 102.172 Two ambiguities stand out. First, neither paragraphs 103 
and 104 nor the attached explanations offer any guidance on how the block-
ading party may react if there are reasons to believe that goods permitted 
through would be used by hostile armed forces.173 Second, there is little guid-
ance regarding the point at which technical arrangements that impose severe 
delays or costs on those seeking to deliver the relief would become illegal.174 
 
169. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶¶ 768–74, 795; Ferguson, supra note 
5; Alex De Waal, Mass Starvation Is a Crime—It's Time We Treated It That Way, BOSTON RE-
VIEW (Jan. 14, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/global-justice/alex-de-waal-mass-starvation-
crime%E2%80%94its-time-we-treated-it-way. Similar patterns were observed regarding the 
blockade of Iraq and Kuwait following the former’s invasion of the latter. Provost, supra 
note 57, at 586–88. The same issues can arise in siege warfare. Griffin Paul Jackson, Starva-
tion is a Weapon, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/09/star-
vation-war-crime-syria-yemen-icc.html. See also TURKISH NATIONAL COMMISSION OF IN-
QUIRY, supra note 157, at 71. 
170. On Yemen, see Fink, supra note 3, at 294. 
171. Conley & de Waal, supra note 73, at 702. 
172. AP I, supra note 63, arts. 70(3), 71(3). 
173. The expectation that food and other essentials will be used by both combatants 
and civilians is likely to be well founded in most blockade or siege scenarios. KJ Riordan, 
Shelling, Sniping and Starvation: The Law of Armed Conflict and the Lessons of the Siege of Sarajevo, 41 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY WELLINGTON LAW REVIEW 149, 171 (2010). 
174. Discussing this issue in the broader IHL context, see Yoram Dinstein, The Right to 
Humanitarian Assistance, 53 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 77, 86 (2000); Akande & Gillard, 












On the first point (allowing or denying access), one reading would be 
that the blockading party “must” and “shall” allow access whenever the trig-
ger conditions apply (inadequate supply to civilians, or to civilians and per-
sons hors de combat, respectively), regardless of the consequences of allowing 
that supply.175 After all, there is no explicit discretion to deny access in such 
circumstances. Another, however, might deem the blockading party’s right 
to impose technical arrangements and require supervision to be manifesta-
tions of a deeper underlying right to ensure that essentials are allowed 
through only if strictly humanitarian and destined exclusively for protected 
persons.176 From that perspective, the fact that some of the goods will reach 
combatants would be enough to deny access unless the consequences of that 
denial would be disproportionate.177 Proportionality may also seem to be a 
plausible rule for determining when the impact of technical arrangements 
would be too great to warrant their imposition. On either front, however, 
this would simply shift the work back to paragraph 102(b), with all of the 
difficulties discussed above. 
In sum, despite introducing several layers of humanitarian constraint into 
the law of blockade, the San Remo framework remains surprisingly permis-
sive, with potentially devastating consequences for the civilian population in 
the blockaded territory. It allows purposive mass starvation. The proportion-
ality restraint is isolated from a broader framework of bright-line rules and 
 
175. TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 77 (defining paragraph 103 as 
“identical” to the absolute obligation in Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).  
176. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 90, ¶ 51 (“[T]he obligation to provide 
for free passage of relief consignments is not absolute in character because relief consign-
ments could be abused for military or other harmful purposes.”); Palmer Report, supra note 
133, ¶ 80 (“[I]t does not follow from this obligation that the naval blockade is per se unlaw-
ful or that Israel as the blockading power is required to simply let vessels carrying aid 
through the blockade. On the contrary, humanitarian missions must respect the security 
arrangements put in place by Israel. They must seek prior approval from Israel and make 
the necessary arrangements with it. This includes meeting certain conditions such as per-
mitting Israel to search the humanitarian vessels in question.”). 
177. Michael Schmitt, Kieran Tinkler & Durward Johnson, The UN Yemen Report and 
Siege Warfare, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66137/the-un-
yemen-report-and-siege-warfare/. Relatedly, see Riordan, supra note 173, at 176–77 (“Un-
less there are serious reasons to believe that they will be misused, the commander must 
allow the free passage of all consignments of humanitarian aid and other essentials.”); Ruth 
Abril Stoffels, Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflicts: Achievements and 
Gaps, 86 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 515, 542 (2004) (if an “excessively 
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applied in a context where its weaknesses as a restriction are maximally ex-
posed. And the conduct rules in paragraphs 103 and 104 are unlikely to rem-
edy these defects, particularly (though not exclusively) in contexts in which 
it cannot be guaranteed that essential goods allowed through would be used 
exclusively for the benefit of civilians. 
 
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR A PERMISSIVE LAW OF BLOCKADE 
 
Given these significant humanitarian vulnerabilities, one might question 
whether the framework laid out in the San Remo Manual is compatible with 
the move towards a firm prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare. 
Part V makes the case that it falls short of the proper understanding of that 
prohibition. Some, however, have taken the opposite view, arguing that re-
strictions such as those provided in the San Remo framework are, if any-
thing, more demanding than existing IHL, including that codified in the Ad-
ditional Protocols. On this view, in the context of encirclement, and partic-
ularly blockade, it remains lawful to starve the civilian population, including 
by blocking humanitarian aid. 
 
A. Special Permissions at Sea and the Law of Blockade 
 
One version of this argument is specific to blockades. It rests on two core 
claims. First, even if the provisions of Additional Protocol I (and any cus-
tomary analogues) preclude encirclement starvation in land sieges, those 
rules are inapplicable to naval warfare, including blockades. Second, the law 
of naval warfare has long allowed for starvation in the specific context of 
naval blockade and the San Remo drafters’ efforts to progressively develop 
the law through paragraphs 102–4 of the Manual have not been successful in 
reshaping State practice and opinio juris. 
This blockade-specific argument places great weight on a combination 
of the Commentary to Protocol I and a particular reading of Article 49(3) of 
the Protocol, rooted in its relationship to the goal of some of the drafting 
States, including France and the United Kingdom, to exclude blockades 
from the rules on starvation and humanitarian access.178 Article 49(3) states, 
 
178. Drew, supra note 13, at 314, 316; DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra 
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The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which 
may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on 
land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against 
objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.179 
 
A committee rapporteur discussing what would become Article 54 during 
drafting stated, “The fact that the paragraph [in Article 54] does not change 
the law of naval blockade is made clear by Article [49].”180 The official Com-
mentary to Protocol I states, without further explanation, that this observation 
“appears to be correct.”181 
On this view, the traditional law of blockade endured untouched by the 
framework enshrined in Article 54 of Protocol I.182 As such, in their assess-
ment of the law of blockade as “one of the few aspects of the law of naval 
warfare which has been affected by the adoption of Additional Protocol I,” 
the San Remo drafters would appear to have acted in error, thereby under-
mining the authority of the restrictions on blockades asserted in paragraph 
102 of the Manual.183 
The reliance of this argument on the final clause of Article 49(3) is sig-
nificant in two respects. First, as ought to be apparent from a plain reading 
of the text, it is a highly contestable interpretation. Indeed, as discussed in 
Part V, it is ultimately untenable. Second, even assuming the British and 
French reading of Article 49(3) were correct, it would render inapplicable to 
blockades only those provisions of Additional Protocol I in the same section 
of the treaty as Article 49. Article 54 falls into that category, but Article 70 
does not. Thus, despite having accepted that Article 54 does not apply to 
blockades, the official Commentary provides that  
 
 
naval blockade, submarine warfare or mine warfare. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DE-
FENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 5.34.2, 9.12.4 (2004) [herein-
after UK MANUAL]. 
179. AP I, supra 63, art. 49(3). 
180. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2092. 
181. Id. See also id. ¶ 2114. 
182. Drew, supra note 13, at 311–12; ERIC TALBOT JENSEN, GEOFFREY S. CORN, M. 
CHRISTOPHER JENKS, RICHARD JACKSON & VICTOR HANSEN, THE LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 446 (2014). See generally supra Part II. 
183. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 102.19. Dinstein describes the Manual’s framework as “a 
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If the effects of the blockade lead to [starvation conditions], reference 
should be made to Article 70 of the Protocol (Relief actions), which pro-
vides that relief actions should be undertaken when the civilian population 
is not adequately provided with food and medical supplies, clothing, bed-
ding, means of shelter and other supplies essential to its survival.184 
 
The significance of that caveat depends on whether one accepts a narrow or 
broad reading of Article 70. France and the United Kingdom issued reserva-
tions to Article 70 specifying that, for them, the provision does not apply to 
naval blockade, submarine warfare, or mine warfare.185 
 
B. Encirclement Starvation and a Permissive Reading of Additional Protocol I 
 
The more comprehensive argument for the permissibility of encirclement 
starvation does not rely on a blockade carve-out. Those taking this view note 
that starvation sieges and blockades have long been part of the practice of 
war,186 reason that “a clear intention would need to be expressed in a treaty 
to abolish such a well-established practice,”187 and contend that no such clar-
ity exists with respect to the rules in the Additional Protocols.188 The argu-
ment has four steps. 
First, it is claimed that for the starvation of the civilian population to be 
a “method” of warfare (as prohibited in paragraph 1 of Article 54), starvation 
 
184. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2095. 
185. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Reservation/ Declaration, ICRC, 
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MStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470 (United Kingdom ¶ (p); France, ¶ 17) (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2021). 
186. See supra Part II. Even critical analyses of encirclement starvation often begin with 
the premise that “Blockades, sieges and siege-like warfare are not per se prohibited by in-
ternational humanitarian law ….” Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 357. 
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must be inflicted purposefully on the civilian population with a view to ad-
vancing the war effort.189 Civilian starvation arising as the collateral conse-
quence of an otherwise lawful action would not meet that threshold.190 This 
position is not quite the same as that of paragraph 102(a) of the San Remo 
Manual in that it would seem to accept that the purposeful starvation of ci-
vilians is prohibited, even if it is not the only purpose. However, when inter-
preted narrowly and offered without the proportionality or humanitarian ac-
cess requirements of the San Remo Manual (or with significantly diluted ver-
sions thereof), the overall effect may still be an even weaker regulatory sys-
tem than is provided by the latter. 
Significant authorities endorse the notion that the ban on starvation in-
cludes some form of purpose element. In its affirmation of the customary 
status of the prohibition, the United States’ DoD Law of War Manual states 
that the ban applies only to operations the purpose of which is to starve the 
civilian population.191 Purposive language also arises in the military manuals 
of other States, including some that are party to the First Protocol, as well as 
in the HPCR Manual on Air and Missile Warfare.192 Perhaps more surprisingly, 
 
189. Drew, supra note 13, at 314; Watts, supra note 13, at 18–19. One might point here 
to the ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, which reasons “To use [starvation] as a 
method of warfare would be to provoke it deliberately, causing the population to suffer 
hunger, particularly by depriving it of its sources of food or of supplies.” COMMENTARY ON 
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2089. See also id. ¶ 4791. 
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supply lines which are also used for the transportation of food” UK MANUAL, supra note 
178, ¶ 5.27.1. See also AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, ADDP 06.4, LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.37 (2006), https://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/documents/doc-
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191. U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, § 5.20.1 (recognizing starvation 
to be banned when “specifically directed against the enemy civilian population. For example, 
it would be prohibited to destroy food or water supplies for the purpose of denying suste-
nance to the civilian population”); § 17.9.2.1 (“It is only actions that are for the purpose of 
starving civilians as a method of combat that are prohibited under this rule”). Much like the 
San Remo Manual, the DoD Manual also incorporates a proportionality requirement into its 
understanding of the prohibition of starvation. Id. § 5.20.2. 
192. See, e.g., ADDP 06.4, supra note 190, ¶ 5.37 (but note id. ¶¶ 7.12, 9.32); UK MA-
NUAL, supra note 178, ¶¶ 5.27.2, 5.34.3; HPCR MANUAL, supra note 11, r. 97, cmt. ¶ 2, r. 
157(a). See also NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE, DM 112, INTERIM LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT MANUAL, §§ 504(2) [including n. 9], 613(2) (1992) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND IN-
TERIM LOAC MANUAL]. Note, however, that the emphasis on specific purpose in the 1992 













the ICRC in its study of customary IHL specifies that the “prohibition of 
starvation as a method of warfare does not prohibit siege warfare as long as 
the purpose is to achieve a military objective and not to starve a civilian pop-
ulation.”193 This language is often drawn upon by expert bodies.194 
On the most limited reading of the starvation ban along these lines, it is 
permissible to starve combatants through starving the entire population, ci-
vilian and otherwise, of the area within which they are encircled—or, in 
terms used to describe the starvation tactics of the Derg in the 1980s in Ethi-
opia, to “drain[] the sea to catch the fish.”195 Sean Watts defends this position 
on the grounds that, given the impossibility of ensuring discrimination in the 
ultimate delivery of relief, any alternative interpretation would compel “be-
sieging forces to alleviate starvation of . . . trapped enemy forces.”196 This 
highly restricted understanding of purpose starts to resemble that of 102(a) 
in the San Remo framework. 
The second step of the argument for the permissibility of encirclement 
starvation asserts that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54 of Protocol I are 
separate and distinct from the general prohibition on starvation as a method 
of warfare in paragraph 1 of the provision.197 Recall that paragraph 2 prohib-
its certain forms of depriving the civilian population of objects essential to 
their survival for the purpose of denying sustenance to the adverse party, 
and paragraph 3 prohibits certain kinds of operations that do not have civil-
ian starvation as their purpose but do cause civilian starvation or the forced 
movement of the civilian population. Asserting that these provisions are dis-
tinct from the general prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare al-
lows for a reading according to which their broader prohibition of incidental 
 
DM (2 ed), MANUAL OF ARMED FORCES LAW: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT §§ 8.8.25-
8.8.26(a, c) (2019) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND LOAC MANUAL]. The one case in which the 
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licates the San Remo Manual, including on the issue of proportionality. Id. §§ 8.8.26(b), 10.5.4.   
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194. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶¶ 357, 511. The Report is not entirely 
consistent on this point. See, e.g., infra note 311 and accompanying text. 
195. Beth Van Schaack, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians as a Weapon of War and 
War Crime, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/29157/siege-war-
fare-starvation-civilians-war-crime/ (Quoting a Canadian war crimes investigation team rap-
porteur on Sarajevo lamenting: “One is left with the unpalatable fact that, unless there is a 
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is over the starved bodies of the civilian population.”). 
196. Watts, supra note 13, at 19. 
197. Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 761–65. But see 












starvation is not incompatible with a purposive interpretation of paragraph 
1.198 Alternatively, some have even challenged the natural reading of para-
graph 3 (or its customary analogue), insisting that the ban on depriving civil-
ians of objects indispensable to their survival should also be understood in 
purposive terms.199 
Third, it is argued that paragraph 2 of Article 54 provides an exhaustive 
and narrowly defined list of the prohibited ways of depriving the civilian 
population of objects indispensable to the survival of its members.200 Specif-
ically, it prohibits attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless such 
objects; any other mode of depriving the civilian population of access to 
 
198. AFRICA WATCH, EVIL DAYS: THIRTY YEARS OF WAR AND FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA 
141 (1991), cited in Marcus, supra note 2, at 257. 
199. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-
10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS § 8.3 (2017) (“The intentional destruction of food, crops, livestock, drinking 
water, and other objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, for the specific 
purpose of denying the civilian population of their use, is prohibited.” (emphasis added). See, 
e.g., provisions in the military manuals of Australia, Ecuador, and New Zealand, cited in 2 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, r. 54, https://ihl-data-
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in the same law of war manuals. See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND INTERIM LOAC MANUAL, supra 
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NEW ZEALAND LOAC MANUAL, supra note 192, §§ 8.8.25-8.8.27. See also ADDP 06.4, supra 
note 190, ¶¶ 7.12, 9.32. 
200. This distinction is raised even by some who do not support a broad permission to 
starve. Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 762–65. Importantly, 
despite having identified the distinction between Article 54(1) and 54(2)–(3), Akande and 
Gillard question the normative basis for this distinction and raise skepticism about whether 
“method of warfare” really implies purpose. Id. at 765. In line with the San Remo Manual, 
they also argue that proportionality provides a safeguard here (id.) and that humanitarian 
access rules have the practical implication “that measures that can be expected to lead to 
the starvation of civilians should not be imposed.” Id. at 768–69. They further indicate that 
the requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians and not to engage in indis-
criminate attacks raises problems for starvation methods that are indiscriminate, irrespective 
of purpose. Id. at 766. D’Alessandra and Gillett treat the case of an attack on indispensable 
objects differently from that of an encirclement, focusing more on purpose in the latter case. 
D'Alessandra & Gillett, supra note 68, at 827–29, 831–32. However, drawing on the ICRC 
Commentary, they appear ultimately to take the view that an encirclement that causes starva-












those objects remains permissible unless it falls afoul of the overarching pro-
hibition in Article 54(1).201 Encircling an area and denying the passage of es-
sential goods to the starving civilian population would not be prohibited by 
paragraphs 2 and 3 because it involves blocking the delivery of objects indis-
pensable to civilian survival, not attacking, destroying, removing, or render-
ing useless those objects.202 Even the most flexible of the action terms in the 
provision (“rendering useless”) does not stretch easily to encompass siege or 
blockade tactics.203 
Fourth, the argument for an expansive permission to starve by encircle-
ment rejects the utility of humanitarian access provisions in resolving the 
infirmity of Article 54. Specifically, it is noted that Article 70 of Protocol I 
provides that impartial humanitarian action shall be undertaken to relieve 
inadequately supplied populations only “subject to the agreement of the Par-
ties concerned.”204 The Protocol, the argument goes, imposes no limit on 
concerned States’ discretion to withhold that consent.205 Therefore, States 
may withhold consent in order to further their war aims through imposing a 
comprehensive starvation siege.206 On this reading, the humanitarian access 
obligations provided in paragraphs 103–4 of the San Remo Manual go beyond 
the requirements of the Protocol or any reflection thereof in customary 
law.207 
Defending this interpretation, Watts notes that Article 70 lacks language 
equivalent to that in Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV restricting the de-
nial of relief to children, expectant mothers, and maternity cases to cases 
when there are “serious reasons for fearing” the consequences outlined in 
Part II (capacious as those are).208 As such, he argues, “it appears States were 
only willing to abandon the GC IV limited scope of relief and protected 
persons [for coverage of all civilians and a wider range of relief] in exchange 
for discretion to permit or reject these broader relief actions during siege.”209 
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Suggesting they agree that the Geneva Convention IV rule is not entirely 
subsumed by the Protocol I rule, several States that are party to Protocol I 
still incorporate the exceptions articulated in Article 23 of the Fourth Con-
vention into their military manuals.210 Sassòli and Bouvier describe the Arti-
cle 70 consent clause as a “severe limitation” in the Additional Protocol’s 
protection of the civilian population’s right to humanitarian relief.211 
 
C. Precautions as Authorizations  
 
A final argument would flip the duty to allow civilians to exit the besieged 
area from a cumulative constraint into a ground for reducing the protection 
for those who remain. This controversial line of reasoning can supplement 
either of the first two forms of argument outlined in this Part. Although 
most obviously relevant in land sieges, an argument along these lines could 
arise in the context of a naval blockade, and certainly in the context of a 
combined land and naval encirclement. 
As noted above, the recent U.S. recognition of the duty to allow civilian 
exit roots that obligation in the general precautionary requirements of 
IHL.212 This is not an uncommon line of reasoning,213 although some also 
root the duty to allow egress in the obligation of parties to remove civilians 
and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives.214  
In its ordinary application to attacks, the relevant precautions rule re-
quires that belligerents take all feasible measures to minimize civilian loss.215 
Transposed to the encirclement context, that might be thought to underpin 
and entail both the duty codified in the San Remo Manual to allow essentials 
through when the besieged (and legally protected) population is deprived and 
a duty to allow fleeing civilians safe passage out of the besieged area, as well 
as any other measures that would limit civilian damage.216 
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Some, however, argue that a besieging party that allows protected per-
sons safe passage out of the besieged area thereby provides the justificatory 
foundation for starving those that remain.217 For example, in analyzing situ-
ations in which civilians remain in the encircled area (whether by their own 
accord or due to the requirements of the besieged party), the UK Manual of 
the Law of Armed Conflict states, “so long as the besieging commander left 
open his offer to allow civilians and the wounded and sick to leave the be-
sieged area, he would be justified in preventing any supplies from reaching 
that area.”218 Under this line of reasoning, what might have been thought to 
be a cumulative obligation (one that adds to duties of discrimination, non-
starvation, allowing humanitarian access when there is an inadequate supply 
of essentials, and so on) instead becomes the key underpinning of an author-
ization to starve civilians—seemingly overriding those other IHL duties. 
In the traditional defense of this position, Spaight contends that when 
the civilian population remains voluntarily, “[t]he solidarity between the 
troops and the inhabitants of a fortified town . . . may almost be said to 
deprive the latter, temporarily, of their non- combatant character.”219 More 
recently, Dinstein asks, “if civilians in a besieged venue are offered a safe 
passage out of an encircled area but choose to stay in situ, what lawful claim 
do they have for special protection from the hardships of starvation?”220 This 
may appear to bear some relation to a position advanced by some regarding 
the status of voluntary human shields, although, for reasons discussed below, 
the analogy is flawed in a number of ways.221 
Others have argued that in the alternative case in which the encircled 
party forces civilians to remain, responsibility for the latter’s suffering and 
death would lie exclusively with that party, rather than with the encircling 
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party.222 This argument relies either on the besieged party’s broad duty to 
take “necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual ci-
vilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting 
from military operations,” including by removing civilians from areas of dan-
ger and avoiding the co-location of civilians and military objectives, or on its 
narrower but stricter obligation not to use human shields.223 
Along these lines, Watts argues that the besieged party’s failure on such 
dimensions ought to “significantly alter[]” the evacuation and relief obliga-
tions of the besieging party. 224 In his view, “The fact that the besieged force, 
not the besieging force, exercises immediate and direct control over the be-
sieged area and its civilian population makes a compelling case for allocating 
the balance of humanitarian responsibility to the former.”225 Parallel argu-
ments have, of course, long been made in debates regarding the targeting of 
military objectives in densely populated areas or situations in which the ad-
versary is alleged to be using involuntary human shields.226 This, too, is ad-
dressed in the next Part.227 
 
D. Proportionality Revisited 
 
For reasons explored above, the proportionality rule articulated in paragraph 
102(b) of the San Remo Manual is unlikely to be a significant constraint in 
practice. For some advocates of the permissibility of encirclement starvation, 
however, the provision is objectionable not because it offers too little in the 
way of humanitarian protection, but because it demands too much of the 
encircling party and (for reasons discussed in Part III) is not underpinned by 
robust legal foundations.228 
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Watts, for example, opposes the incorporation of a proportionality rule 
into the law of siege starvation because it “greatly limits the militarily essen-
tial task of physically isolating enemy forces from life-sustaining supplies 
when these forces are encircled along with civilians.”229 Drew is more sym-
pathetic to the rule, arguing that by incorporating proportionality require-
ments into the Manual’s section on the law of blockade, the drafters (lauda-
bly) pushed the boundaries of lex ferenda.230 In his view, although this move 
was sure to “invite backlash” from positivists, it was an effort that was in the 
spirit (if not the clear text) of the First Protocol. 231 However, although the 
move has gained traction in military manuals, Drew expresses skepticism 
about its impact on hard State practice.232 The consequence of that final anal-
ysis would seem to be that retaining the San Remo provision on proportion-
ality in the revised edition would continue to promote lex ferenda, after a quar-
ter-century of the first such effort failing to gain traction. To put it another 
way, Drew’s position implies that if the revision is to be faithful to customary 
international law today, it will reverse the original edition’s incorporation of 
proportionality as a failed effort to push the law forward.233  
 
E. Starvation and Military Necessity 
 
The normative underpinning of the arguments for a broad permission to 
starve is military necessity. Michael Walzer responds to those who might 
question why civilian deaths can be inflicted by encirclement in ways that 
would otherwise be prohibited, “The obvious answer is simply that the cap-
ture of cities is often an important military objective . . . and frontal assault 
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siege methods have long been given leniency in customary law because they 
were seen as the only viable means of securing certain military objectives. . 
. . [Therefore,] the international community expressed a reluctance, even 
among the strongest condemners of Serb practices [in the sieges of Sara-
jevo and Srebrenica], to accept the wholesale rejection of siege as a legiti-
mate instrument.235 
 
Similar arguments extend to naval warfare. As Heintschel von Heinegg puts 
it, “blockade remains a most efficient method for subduing the enemy.”236 
Along these lines, Dinstein has condemned Article 54 of Protocol I in 
part because its posture on siege warfare is “untenable in practice, since no 
other method of warfare has been devised to bring about the capture of a 
defended town.”237 Less willing than Dinstein to accept the comprehensive-
ness of Article 54’s prohibition, Watts claims that “operationally trou-
bling”238 efforts to interpret its rules to underpin an obligation on the part of 
a besieging party to allow in humanitarian relief so as to avert starvation are 
driven by a myopic “resort to humanitarian objects or purposes, without 
equal attention to military necessity.” 239 For him, such interpretations fail to 
take seriously the possibility that “permissive rules for withholding consent 
to relief actions reflect not inadequacies but rather the presently-operative 
balance between humanity and military necessity.”240 His claim is that any-
thing short of total isolation (including on the dimension of humanitarian 
aid) radically undermines the efficacy of siege warfare.241 The problem, from 
this perspective, as Provost frames it, is that “when a shipment of food des-
tined for the adverse country is intercepted, it is impossible to determine 
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V. A REBUTTAL 
 
Critiques of the San Remo Manual’s humanitarian restrictions on blockades as 
excessive are misplaced. Quite the opposite, the Manual’s weaknesses are 
such that it fails to reflect the comprehensive prohibition of starvation in the 
contemporary law of armed conflict. The starvation of civilians through en-
circlement deprivation is prohibited even if the operation has a military pur-
pose, regardless of whether civilians are offered a path out, regardless of the 
reasons that some do not exit the besieged or encircled location, and irre-
spective of the weight of the military advantage to be gained from breaking 
the resistance of the encircled area. The ban is categorical. There is no ex-
ception for blockades. 
 
A. The Fallacy of Blockade Exceptionalism 
 
Consider the issue of blockade exceptionalism first. As discussed in the pre-
vious Part, the ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I indicates that the 
starvation ban does not apply to blockades because Article 49(3) of Protocol 
I stipulates that the relevant section of the treaty is not intended to “affect 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the 
air.”243 
Although oft-cited by proponents of a broad right to impose starvation 
blockades, this interpretation flies in the face of the plain language of the 
provision. Article 49(3) does not indicate that the law of naval warfare re-
mains untouched by the rules protecting civilians from the effects of hostil-
ities. On the contrary, it identifies two categories of naval warfare that are 
impacted by those rules. Specifically, it states that the Protocol rules on pro-
tecting civilians from the effects of hostilities “apply to any land, air or sea 
warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civil-
ian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from 
the air against objectives on land . . . .”244 It is only with respect to aspects of 
naval warfare falling outside of those two categories that the Protocol does 
not “affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea 
or in the air.” A naval blockade that imposes starvation conditions on the 
civilian population on land is unambiguously a form of “sea warfare” that 
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“may affect the civilian population . . . on land.” As such, it is plainly within 
the scope of Article 54.245 
It is undeniable that the ICRC Commentary to Protocol I and at least some 
of the drafters contradict this reading of the impact of Article 49(3) on the 
reach of Article 54. However, neither commentaries nor drafting histories 
are ordinarily thought sufficient to override a clear textual meaning.246 Far 
from being interpretively radical for a legal authority to apply Article 54 to 
the situation of a naval blockade, it is difficult to see how it could do anything 
else without deviating radically from the plain meaning of Article 49(3). 
Apart from the issue of how to interpret Additional Protocol I, there is 
clear support for the customary prohibition of starvation in naval block-
ades.247 Consider, in this regard, the posture of the ICC Statute. As is clear 
both from its general jurisdictional provisions and the Court’s analysis of the 
MV Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, the ICC Statute applies in the naval do-
main.248 There is neither a general naval carve-out in the war crimes provi-
sions nor a specific qualifier excluding blockades from the war crime of star-
vation.249 As such, the only way to deny the applicability of that crime to 
blockades under the ICC regime would be to refer to the chapeau of Article 
8(2)(b), which defines all of the listed war crimes as “serious violations of 
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the 
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established framework of international law,”250 and to argue that the under-
lying IHL regime does not prohibit starvation in naval warfare for the rea-
sons already stated.251 
Such a line of reasoning is difficult to sustain.252 Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) re-
fers specifically to the denial of humanitarian aid, was drafted in a context in 
which the applicability of some form of starvation ban to blockades had al-
ready been recognized in the San Remo Manual, and was agreed at a time when 
the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) had already demonstrated a willingness to break down formal classi-
fication categories when they lack a persuasive normative rationale.253 De-
spite that context, States made no effort to exclude blockade from the war 
crime of the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. It is hard to be-
lieve that this was due to widespread confidence that the chapeau of 8(2)(b) 
would preclude the application of the crime to that context with such clarity 
that nothing more needed to be said to qualify it.254 On the contrary, given 
the clear lack of consensus in favor of such a preclusion, the ICC provision 
would seem to apply straightforwardly to blockades. Moreover, precisely be-
cause of the relationship between the war crime and the underlying IHL rule, 
the lack of any blockade exceptionalism at the ICC is a significant indication 
of ICC States Parties’ understanding of the absence of any such exception-
alism in the underlying IHL rule. 
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The case for blockade exceptionalism in NIACs is even weaker. First, 
there is currently no clarity regarding whether blockade law (and thus any 
derivative exception to standard rules of IHL) applies in NIACs.255 Second, 
regardless of one’s position on that debate, Article 13 of the Second Protocol 
provides that the civilian protections contained therein “shall be observed in 
all circumstances,”256 and the Commentary expresses none of the blockade ex-
ceptionalism found in the Commentary to Protocol I. Instead, it states that the 
“use of blockade and siege as methods of warfare remain legitimate” under 
Article 14 only “provided they are directed exclusively against combatants.”257 
Recognizing the likely objection that this is incompatible with the very nature 
of a blockade and thus an “unrealistic” constraint on the use of blockades, 
the Commentary responds “as soon as there is a lack of indispensable objects, 
the international relief actions provided for in Article 18 should be author-
ized to enable the obligation following from Article 14 to be respected.”258 
If naval blockade exceptionalism were to hold for IACs, it would be a rare 
area of the law of war in which the restrictions on conduct in NIACs exceed 
those applicable in IACs. 
Ultimately, the San Remo Manual is correct to identify the starvation ban 
as applicable in blockades (albeit that it defines the contours of that ban in 
problematic ways, as detailed below). However, by excluding any mention of 
the starvation ban from its general provisions, it could be read to imply that 
the ban does not apply to other forms of naval encirclement or naval warfare 
more broadly. On the narrower reading of the applicability of blockade law, 
that would leave NIAC naval warfare unregulated by the starvation ban, even 
though the applicability of the NIAC prohibition of starvation would seem 
to be even less subject to debate than is the IAC prohibition. 
 
B. Clarifying What Counts as the Purposive Starvation of the Civilian Population 
 
If naval blockades are indeed governed by the rules of the Additional Proto-
cols and their customary analogues, the key question is what those frame-
works mean for the rules around starvation in the blockade context. One of 
the areas of dispute identified above focuses on whether the proportionality 
requirement in paragraph 102(b) of the San Remo Manual imposes a con-
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straint on blockades that exceeds the demands of existing customary inter-
national law, or whether it is instead a paper tiger that conceals an overly 
permissive framework for the regulation of encirclement starvation. In the 
background of that dispute is the issue of how to understand the role (if any) 
of purpose in defining the primary starvation ban. The narrower the primary 
ban, the greater the role for proportionality, and thus the greater the stakes 
in the debate regarding the utility of proportionality as a constraint in the 
blockade context. For that reason, it is important to start with the primary 
prohibition. 
Recall that some have seized on the use of the term “method” to infer 
an element of purpose in that ban, as codified in treaty law in Articles 54(1) 
of Additional Protocol I, 14 of Additional Protocol II, and 8(2)(b)(xxv) and 
8(2)(e)(xix) of the Rome Statute.259 For reasons elaborated in the ensuing 
Sections, that claim is unconvincing. However, even if one accepts arguendo 
that the ban is limited to purposive civilian starvation, that proscription, 
properly understood, would still be far broader than the “sole purpose” pro-
hibition articulated in paragraph 102(a) of the San Remo Manual.260 Moreover, 
outlawed by that additional breadth would be a range of blockades that 
would not unambiguously violate the supplementary proportionality rule in 
paragraph 102(b). In that sense, the invocation of paragraph 102(b) in the 
San Remo Explanation’s defense of the extraordinary narrowness of 102(a) 
is unpersuasive. On the specific issue of civilian starvation,261 the combina-
tion of the two paragraphs falls short of even a purposive interpretation of 
the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare, properly understood. 
This becomes clear when one focuses on blockades imposed with the 
goal of starving besieged combatants into submission. Such operations do 
not aim exclusively to starve civilians, so they would avoid the ban articulated 
in paragraph 102(a). As long as they promise great military advantage, such 
blockades could also avoid unambiguous prohibition according to the terms 
of paragraph 102(b). And yet, in most circumstances, such blockades would 
clearly violate even a purposive interpretation of the prohibition of starva-
tion as a method of warfare. 
Encirclement deprivation aimed at starving out combatants depends typ-
ically on the denial of essentials to the entire population of the besieged or 
blockaded area. It is only through the infliction of starvation conditions on 
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that broader population that the besieging party has any chance to starve out 
the combatants within.262 When the combatant population is starved through 
the starvation of the population as a whole in this way, the latter overarching 
policy, and not its ultimate objective, is the method of warfare. Put another 
way, the ultimate goal of starving combatants in such a context entails a 
predicate purpose of starving the population within which they are en-
sconced. The question, then, is how to understand the status of that broader 
population. 
Additional Protocol I reflects customary law in providing, “The presence 
within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the 
definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian charac-
ter.”263 In its judgment in the case against Radovan Karadžić, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber affirmed prior jurisprudence according to which “a population 
may qualify as civilian as long as it is predominantly civilian,” holding on that 
basis that “the population of the urban areas inside the confrontation lines 
of Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995 had civilian status as a whole,” notwith-
standing the existence of combatants in those areas.264 It is hard to imagine 
a blockade aimed at starving out combatants, which would not need as its 
predicate purpose the starvation of a civilian population thus defined.  That 
the commander may (or may not) lament the civilian suffering and death that 
ensues has no bearing on whether this is the method of warfare pursued.265 
As noted above, a number of authorities challenge the application of the 
starvation ban to collateral or incidental civilian starvation.266 However, even 
accepting that premise, civilian starvation as the predicate purpose necessary 
for combatant starvation is clearly distinct from incidental civilian starvation, 
properly understood. Examples of the latter would include destroying a 
bridge essential both to the adversary’s supply of weapons or troops and to 
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civilians’ supply of food, or possibly destroying fields of crops used by civil-
ians for sustenance to prevent their parallel use “as concealment by the en-
emy.”267 Blockades that deprive encircled civilian populations of essentials 
with a view to starving out the adversary within are not in that category. They 
starve civilian populations purposefully in order to starve combatants. 
Notably, the ICRC Commentary to Article 14 of the Second Protocol 
(which bans “starvation as a method of combat”) states, “up to now there has 
been no express rule of law forbidding besieging forces to let civilians die of 
starvation.”268 Following the ban on starvation, however, the Commentary rea-
sons, the use of blockade and siege warfare remain legitimate only if “they 
are directed exclusively against combatants.”269 As such, in the aftermath of 
the ban on starvation, military necessity cannot be “used to justify starving 
the civilian population.” 270 The Commentary emphasizes the link to Article 54 
of the First Protocol, particularly concerning the first paragraph (which bans 
starvation as a method of warfare), terming Article 14 of Protocol II “a sim-
plified version” of the Protocol I rule.271 
An interpretation that would allow the practice of starving combatants 
through starving the civilian population would also contradict core principles 
of IHL. In the first instance, it would seem to fall afoul of the general in-
junction in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I that parties must “at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between ci-
vilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their oper-
ations only against military objectives.”272 It would also be in deep normative 
tension with the rules prohibiting indiscriminate attacks. The latter prohibit 
the use of a “method or means of combat which [are not or which] cannot 
be directed at a specific military objective.”273 Even assuming the latter pro-
hibition does not apply directly to blockades (insofar as the latter are not 
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271. Id. ¶ 4792. 
272. AP I, supra note 63, art. 48 (emphasis added). 












“attacks” in the strict sense),274 there is a profound dissonance between an 
interpretation of Article 54 that would allow belligerents to starve indiscrim-
inately and comprehensively the population of an encircled zone and the 
clear rule precluding them from subjecting the very same area to compre-
hensive bombardment. 275 In fact, as argued in the ensuing Sections, far from 
weakening these general restrictions on the conduct of hostilities, the starva-
tion ban supplements them with a heightened categorical prohibition.276 
Before turning to the case against a purposive understanding of the pro-
hibition of starvation as a method of war, note two preliminary implications 
of the argument thus far for the San Remo Manual. First, the argument ex-
poses a gap left by paragraph 102 of the Manual. Even a purposive under-
standing of the starvation ban, properly understood, would prohibit starva-
tion blockades that would be permitted under paragraph 102, because they 
have at least one military purpose and because the military advantage they 
promise would be sufficient to at least muddy any proportionality analysis. 
Second, the argument here would clarify the ambiguity in paragraphs 103–4 
on whether the blockading party’s obligation to permit the passage of essen-
tial goods to deprived populations holds even when the exclusive delivery of 
those supplies to civilians cannot be guaranteed. The preliminary implication 
of the discussion thus far is that, even on a purposive understanding of the 
ban on starvation, the free passage of essentials is required even if the tech-
nical arrangements permitted are insufficient to ensure exclusive civilian de-
livery. Interpreting paragraphs 103–4 to the contrary would erroneously pre-
sume the legality of starving combatants through starving the civilian popu-
lation within which they are ensconced. 
 
C. The Ban on Starvation is not Limited to Purposive Starvation 
 
The argument above accepts the premise that the starvation ban precludes 
only encirclements imposed with the purpose of starving civilians. It shows 
that even if that were correct, the San Remo Manual is overly permissive. The 
premise, however, is mistaken. In addition to relying heavily on a very spe-
cific reading of an ambiguous term, it construes the general prohibition of 
 
274. See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text. 
275. AP I, supra note 63, art. 51(5)(a). On the possible distinction, see Gillard, supra note 
145 at 5, 8. 
276. In work currently in progress, I argue that this heightened protection is best un-
derstood as rooted in the torturous wrong at the heart of starvation tactics. Tom Dannen-












starvation in treaty law in artificial isolation from its context, most notably, 
the subsequent paragraphs of Article 54 of Additional Protocol I. 
The term “method of warfare” is not defined in Additional Protocol I 
or in prior law of war treaties. The Commentary to Protocol I provides only, 
“The term ‘means of combat’ or ‘means of warfare’ generally refers to the 
weapons being used, while the expression ‘methods of combat’ generally re-
fers to the way in which such weapons are used.”277 The focus on weapon 
use in that definition is neither particularly clarifying nor accurate. Various 
tactics are specifically designated as methods in the Protocol, despite involv-
ing no direct use of weapons, including, for example, the improper use of 
emblems and the denial of quarter, as well as starvation itself.278  
What, then, is the meaning of “method of warfare” in such contexts? As 
outlined in Part IV, one way of making sense of the term in article 54(1) 
would be to understand it to limit the prohibition to operations that have the 
starvation of civilians as their purpose. A more capacious view, however, 
would hold that the term “does no more than describe conduct that is part 
of hostilities.”279 To evaluate which end of this interpretive spectrum is more 
compelling, the prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare must be 
evaluated in context.280 
This entails interpreting Article 54(1) in light of Article 54 as a whole. As 
the ICRC Commentary notes, paragraph 2, which prohibits various forms of 
the deprivation of objects indispensable to civilian survival “develops the 
principle formulated in paragraph 1 of prohibiting starvation of the civilian 
population; it describes the most usual ways in which this may be applied.”281 
This relationship between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 54 is also reflected 
in the ICC Statute, which criminalizes the “starvation of civilians as a method 
of warfare” (drawing on the language of Article 54(1) of the First Protocol), 
specifying that such starvation occurs “by depriving them of objects indis-
pensable to their survival” (thereby drawing on the language of the second 
 
277. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 1957. 
278. Gloria Gaggioli & Nils Melzer, Methods of Warfare, in OXFORD GUIDE TO INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 235 (Dapo Akande & Ben Saul eds., 2020)  
279. Wayne Jordash, Catriona Murdoch & Joe Holmes, Strategies for Prosecuting Mass Star-
vation, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 849, 862 (2019); Global Rights 
Compliance & World Peace Foundation, The Crime of Starvation and Methods of Prosecution and 
Accountability, Accountability for Mass Starvation: Testing the Limits of the Law, ¶ 78 (Policy Paper 
#1 2019).  
280. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 246, arts. 31–32. 
281. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2098; see also 












paragraph of Article 54).282 Indeed, the only objective non-contextual ele-
ment of the crime of starvation as a method of warfare in the ICC system is 
that the perpetrator “deprived civilians of objects indispensable to their sur-
vival.”283 Much like the Protocol’s Commentary, then, the Rome Statute un-
derstands the deprivation of objects indispensable to civilian survival to be 
the operationalization of starvation as a method of warfare. This is indicative 
of how parties to the ICC Statute understand their concomitant IHL obliga-
tions.284 
In reading Article 54 coherently, three key features of paragraphs 2 and 
3 warrant attention. First, those paragraphs preclude a narrow purposive 
reading of the core starvation prohibition. Second, they, in fact, preclude an 
interpretation according to which the starvation of civilians is permissible as 
a collateral effect of the deprivation of objects indispensable to their survival. 
Finally, these implications are not limited to a narrow definition of attacking, 
destroying, removing, or rendering useless such objects. The first two points 
are addressed in this Section; the third is elaborated in the next. As such, this 
Section does not distinguish between deprivation of indispensable objects 
by kinetic destruction and deprivation by encirclement and denial. Specific 
issues relating to encirclement are addressed in the ensuing Sections. 
The first point is straightforward. Article 54(2) provides, “It is prohibited 
to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the sur-
vival of the civilian population . . . for the specific purpose of denying them 
for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, 
whatever the motive . . . .”285 This leaves no question that attacking, destroy-
ing, removing, or rendering useless such objects is prohibited even if denying 
their sustenance value to the civilian population is not the purpose. It is 
enough that the purpose is denying their sustenance value to the adverse 
Party. The provision also leaves no doubt that the motive for that denial is 
irrelevant.286 
 
282. ICC Statute, supra note 111, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxv), 8(2)(e)(xix). 
283. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 74, at 31. 
284. Both the IAC and NIAC starvation crimes are enshrined in the Rome Statute as 
“serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in [international armed conflict or 
armed conflicts not of an international character, respectively], within the established frame-
work of international law.” ICC Statute, supra note 111, arts. 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e). 
285. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54(2) (emphasis added). 
286. Emphasizing this point, see Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 934, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) (“[T]he motive for 













Paragraph 3 then provides an exception to and an expansion of that 
broad prohibition. The exception stipulates that the ban shall not apply when 
the objects are used by the adverse party “as sustenance solely for the mem-
bers of its armed forces.”287 Plainly, then, objects used by that party as sus-
tenance for members of the armed forces and civilians are covered by the 
ban. The expansion stipulates that the ban does not apply if the objects are 
used “not as sustenance” but “in direct support of military action, provided, 
however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which 
may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food 
or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.”288 Thus, even when 
the expected starvation of civilians would be genuinely incidental, in some 
of the ways discussed previously (i.e., because the deprivation of the objects 
indispensable to their survival would occur for military reasons other than 
denying their sustenance value) that action would still be legally prohibited 
simply because it is expected to cause starvation.289 Indeed, it would be 
banned even if they might be expected to escape starvation by fleeing the 
starvation conditions imposed upon them. The only remaining incidental 
starvation that would appear to remain legally possible would be that occur-
ring as the result of action that does not involve the direct deprivation of 
essential objects, but which has that effect as one of its downstream conse-
quences. 
The Commentary to Protocol II indicates a similarly comprehensive un-
derstanding of the prohibition in Article 14 of that treaty, noting that the 
“prohibition would be meaningless if one could invoke the argument that 
members of the government's armed forces or armed opposition might 
make use of the objects” and stipulating that 
 
if the objects are used for military purposes by the adversary, they may 
become a military objective and it cannot be ruled out that they may have 
to be destroyed in exceptional cases, though always provided that such action 
does not risk reducing the civilian population to a state of starvation.290  
 
287. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
288. Id. art. 54(3)(b) (emphasis added); see also Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food 
Insecurity, supra note 72, at 764. 
289. Provost, supra note 57, at 604; Allen, supra note 13, at 62; Antonio Coco, Jérôme 
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Although Israel is party to neither Protocol, the Israeli Military Advocate 
General’s Corps manual adopts a similar understanding of the analogous 
customary rule.291 
Ultimately, paragraph 3 of Article 54 clarifies that ordinary precautions 
and proportionality are not sufficient in the context of starvation. In this 
way, it adopts a posture significantly more prohibitive than either the San 
Remo Manual or any of the positions considered in Part IV. It treats starvation 
as a qualitatively different kind of civilian harm, requiring a distinct legal 
framework of protection from that by which civilians are ordinarily pro-
tected under IHL.292 
Ordinarily, under Article 52 of Protocol I, an object that contributes ef-
fectively both to civilians and to military action—a so-called “dual-use ob-
ject”—would qualify as a military objective.293 Rather than precluding the 
attack as a matter of distinction or discrimination, the civilian damage one 
might expect from the destruction of such an object would be prohibitive 
only if disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated, or if adequate 
precautions for its minimization had not been taken.294 
Absent Article 54, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population that also contribute to military action (whether by providing sus-
tenance to the armed forces or otherwise) would clearly fall into the category 
of a dual-use object. As such, they would qualify as a military objective (and 
thus be legitimate targets) but would be protected by the precautions and 
proportionality rules. If that were the way Protocol I sought to treat such 
objects, there would be no need for Article 54, other than to confirm explic-
itly what is already provided in general terms in Article 52. Such redundancy 
is plainly not what was intended. The working group charged with develop-
ing what became Article 54 at the Diplomatic Conference deemed it “one of 
 
291. SCHOOL OF MILITARY LAW, MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, RULES OF 
WARFARE ON THE BATTLEFIELD 25 (2d ed. 2006). 
292. In work currently in progress, I argue that this distinctive treatment is warranted 
in light of the torturous impact of starvation methods. Dannenbaum, supra note 276. 
293. AP I, supra note 63, art. 52(2). See also DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, 
supra note 149, at 120–25. 












the most important articles of humanitarian law.” 295 The Soviet representa-
tive described its Protocol II analogue in Article 14 as “one of the most hu-
mane provisions” in the law of armed conflict.296 
Rather than confirming the Article 52 framework for the specific situa-
tion of objects indispensable to civilian survival, the function of Article 54 is 
instead to divert the deprivation of such objects into a more restrictive 
framework. In paragraph 2, it issues a prohibition on attacks against objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population that is unqualified by 
the ordinary dual-use principles. In paragraph 3, it introduces exceptions to 
that primary ban, which are far narrower than the ordinary dual-use rule, and 
which clearly preclude any attack on such objects that would have the con-
sequence of starving the civilian population. That prohibition is prior to 
questions of proportionality and precautions. It prohibits action irrespective 
of the military advantage anticipated or the civilian loss minimization 
measures undertaken.297 The only exception to its application is the narrow 
scorched-earth exception in paragraph 5. Appropriately, then, in contrast to 
those that attempt to qualify the prohibition with reference to purpose, most 
military manuals simply provide in unequivocal terms that objects indispen-
sable to civilian survival may not be destroyed.298 
 
D. Starvation by Encirclement is Not More Permissible than Starvation by Attack 
 
The question that remains is what this means for deprivation by encirclement 
methods, rather than via operations that “attack, destroy, remove or render 
useless” objects indispensable to civilian survival.299 As discussed above, 
those who argue for an expansive right to engage in starvation sieges and 
blockades point to the use of those terms in paragraph 2 as the reason not 
to apply the approach of paragraphs 2 and 3 to encirclement starvation. 
 
295. Summary Record of the Thirty-first Meeting, Doc. CDDH/III/SR.31 (Mar. 14, 
1975), 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 67, at 300, ¶ 8. See also COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶¶ 2087–88. 
296. Statement of the USSR Representative, Doc. CDDH/SR.52 (June 6, 1977), 7 OF-
FICIAL RECORDS, supra note 67, at 136, ¶ 84. 
297. Akande & Gillard, supra note 72, at 767 (“Article 54(3) AP I appears to modify or 
‘displace’ the rule of proportionality with regard to measures that fall within the list of pro-
hibited activities referred to in Article 54(2)”). As noted above, Akande and Gillard are less 
sure whether this extends to measures taken to starve combatants other than those identified 
in 54(2). See supra note 200. 
298. See 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, r. 54. 












However, regardless of how narrowly one reads the language and direct ap-
plication of paragraphs 2 and 3, this position cannot make sense of Article 
54 as a whole. If the meaning of starvation as a method of warfare were to 
incorporate a purposive element vis-à-vis starving civilians, in what sense 
could paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54 (which clearly prohibit the non-pur-
posive infliction of starvation conditions on the civilian population) be un-
derstood to be manifestations of the general prohibition in paragraph 1? In 
what sense, could they be, as the ICRC Commentary puts it, the “usual ways 
in which [the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare] may be ap-
plied”?300 If they are elaborations of that prohibition, the fact of their appli-
cation to the non-purposive infliction of starvation conditions cannot but be 
relevant to interpreting the meaning of the 54(1) prohibition, including as 
applied to encirclement methods. 
One way to make sense of the provision as a whole would be to interpret 
“starvation as a method of warfare” as the deliberate deprivation of objects 
indispensable to civilian survival, rather than as the final infliction of a par-
ticular impact on civilian victims.301 In one sense, that would track the lan-
guage of the ICC Statute in focusing on such deprivation, and not the final 
outcome, as the crux of the starvation method.302 Along these lines, the 
Group of Experts on Yemen reasoned on the specific issue of what consti-
tutes a method of warfare that “in order for starvation—defined as the depriva-
tion of essential items for the survival of the population—to be considered as an in-
ternational humanitarian law violation, it has to be used as a strategy to defeat 
the other party to the conflict.”303 Engaging in the deprivation of objects 
essential to civilian survival as a strategy to defeat the other party is entirely 
compatible with lacking the purpose of inflicting a particular form of suffer-
ing or harm on the civilian population. Indeed, it would encompass relatively 
straightforwardly within Article 54(1) the kinds of actions prohibited in par-
agraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54. 
 
300. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra notes 73–74. But see TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 78 
(specifically distinguishing starvation from the deprivation of objects essential to civilian 
survival). 
302. Supra note 283. On the other hand, the differentiation between the deprivation of 
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Crimes might be thought to complicate such a reading. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 
74, at 31. 
303. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 741 (emphasis added); see also Jordash, 












Understanding the ban in this way would also call into question the no-
tion that there is a deep qualitative distinction between deprivation by encir-
clement and deprivation by destruction, attack, removal, or rendering use-
less. If starvation as a method of warfare is the deprivation of objects essen-
tial to civilian survival as a strategy to defeat the other party, the question of 
whether it has as its purpose the infliction of a particular kind of suffering 
on the affected civilians is as irrelevant to deprivation by encirclement as it 
clearly is to deprivation by attack, destruction, removal, or rendering useless 
under the terms of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54. Supporting this view, 
the Commentary to the Second Protocol states of the use of the latter terms in 
Article 14: 
 
[C]ertain acts are emphasized, but the list is not exhaustive. Starvation can 
also result from an omission. To deliberately decide not to take measures 
to supply the population with objects indispensable for its survival in a way 
would become a method of combat by default, and would be prohibited 
under this article.304 
 
Drawing a direct connection between the earlier (relatively weak) require-
ments of Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV and the starvation provisions 
of the Protocols,305 the Commentary goes on to address the question of 
whether blocking humanitarian aid would implicate the starvation ban, as-
serting, 
 
If the survival of the population is threatened and a humanitarian organi-
zation fulfilling the required conditions of impartiality and non-discrimina-
tion is able to remedy this situation, relief actions must take place. In fact, 
they are the only way of combating starvation when local resources have 
been exhausted. . . . [A] refusal would be equivalent to a violation of the 
rule prohibiting the use of starvation as a method of combat.306 
 
Developments since the entry into force of the Protocols are also rele-
vant here. In Resolution 2417, the Security Council, “Strongly condemns the 
unlawful denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects in-
dispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supply and 
access for responses to conflict-induced food insecurity in situations of 
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armed conflict, which may constitute a violation of international humanitar-
ian law.”307  
Similarly, Articles 8(2)(b)(xxv) and 8(2)(e)(xix) of the ICC Statute crimi-
nalize “using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them 
of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief 
supplies.”308 For the 123 States Parties to the Rome Statute, then, impeding 
humanitarian aid can count as using starvation as a method of warfare (the 
focus of Article 54(1) of Protocol I) because it is a form of depriving civilians 
of objects indispensable to their survival (the focus of Article 54(2)). As em-
phasized above, this is indicative of those States Parties’ understanding of 
the underlying law of armed conflict.309 In the proposal that led to the unan-
imously approved amendment incorporating the NIAC crime of starvation, 
Switzerland reasoned that “a refusal to grant consent [to humanitarian relief] 
‘without good grounds’ is equivalent to a violation of article 14” of Protocol 
II.310  
Along the same lines, authorities such as the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Libya and the Group of Experts on Yemen have indicated that 
encirclement deprivation can violate the prohibition of starvation as a 
method of warfare through knowingly causing civilians to starve.311 The 
Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan also appears to eschew a 
 
307. S.C. Res 2417, ¶ 6 (May 24, 2018). See also id. ¶ 10 (urging States to investigate 
“violations of international humanitarian law related to the use of starvation of civilians as 
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308. ICC Statute, supra note 111, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxv), 8(2)(e)(xix). The IAC provision ref-
erences the impediment of relief supplies “as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.” 
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U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (Mar. 8, 2012); Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶¶ 
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purposive understanding of the ban on starvation by encirclement, which it 
treats no differently from deprivation by destruction or pillage.312 
Given this context, it is incumbent on those who would distinguish en-
circlement to explain what would justify its differential treatment. One might 
argue that encirclement starvation tactics are appropriately the subject of less 
stringent restriction than are kinetic attacks because they harm civilians only 
on a slower, incremental timeline.313 Indeed, encirclement and denial tactics 
are structured precisely so as to succeed before the entire encircled population 
is wiped out, thereby avoiding the outcome they threaten. The point of a 
siege or blockade is to stimulate capitulation before it causes starvation or 
famine. The stretched temporal horizon of the encirclement method allows 
those impacted the time to react and respond so as to avoid the ultimate 
harm. 
This, however, is not a plausible distinction. Whatever the validity of 
distinguishing slow from quick inflictions of death and human suffering,314 
that distinction does not differentiate between different kinds of starvation 
tactics. Whether starvation is caused by destroying crops or by encircling and 
denying their transfer to a particular population, the impact is equally slow 
and torturous. In either case, it is possible that the surrender of the affected 
party could alleviate it. And, in either case, allowing through humanitarian 
aid could avert it for the population reached by that aid. If it is prohibited to 
destroy foodstuffs whenever they are not used exclusively for the sustenance 
of combatants (irrespective of the military advantage promised), why would 
 
312. See generally Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, supra note 116. Implic-
itly eschewing a purposive interpretation, see id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 105. For more on how to under-
stand the report, see Tom Dannenbaum, A Landmark Report on Starvation as a Method of War-
fare, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73350/a-landmark-re-
port-on-starvation-as-a-method-of-warfare/. 
313. To be clear, kinetic attacks may have reverberating effects that percolate on a 
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Effects’ of Explosive Weapons, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY BLOG (Mar. 2, 2017), 
https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/03/02/war-in-cities-the-reverberating-ef-
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Humanitarian Law: The “Reasonable Military Commander” Standard and Reverberating Effects, 51 
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 835 (2018). Nonetheless, a kinetic attack 
is characterized primarily by the instantaneousness of its impact. 
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it be permitted to deprive those combatants of the same food by encircle-
ment if the deprivation would also impact civilians? If it is prohibited to de-
stroy those crops when they are used for military purposes other than suste-
nance if the consequence would be the starvation or forced movement of 
civilians, why would it be permitted to encircle the same population with the 
same effect? The answer cannot refer to the immediacy of the initial destruc-
tion. That same immediacy applies to the destruction of objects protected 
under Article 52 of Additional Protocol I and the corollary customary rule. 
What distinguishes objects protected under Article 54 is their essential value 
to the humans who depend on them. Indeed, Article 54(2) is not concerned 
at all with the objects for their own sake—it is violated equally whether they 
are removed (and thus maintained in both their form and future utility) or 
destroyed. The special concern for, and protection of, the objects is derived 
instead from their essential value to specific populations. The denial of that 
value is indistinguishable whether the object is destroyed or obstructed from 
delivery. What, then, would be the justification for treating encirclement dep-
rivation differently from any other form of deprivation? 
Ultimately, an interpretation of 54(1) and the concomitant customary 
rule that is not limited to actions pursued with the purpose of inflicting star-
vation conditions on civilians and that does not treat encirclement depriva-
tion differently from deprivation of other kinds is superior. It makes better 
sense of the structure of Article 54 as a whole and it rests on a more norma-
tively coherent foundation. 
 
E. Humanitarian Access and Starvation 
 
Related to the question of how to interpret Articles 54 and 14 on the issue 
of humanitarian relief is the question of how to understand the humanitarian 
access provisions in Articles 70 and 18 of Protocols I and II, respectively. 
Here, the key issue is whether language rendering access “subject to the 
agreement” of concerned parties entails that besieging belligerents have an 
unfettered right to block those seeking to deliver humanitarian assistance to 
the encircled population. 
The ICRC commentaries deny that discretion on this issue is unlimited. 
The Protocol I Commentary asserts that “a Party refusing its agreement must 
do so for valid reasons, not for arbitrary or capricious ones.”315 The Protocol 
II Commentary is more specific, adding, “If the survival of the population is 
 












threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling the required conditions 
of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy this situation, relief 
actions must take place. . . . The authorities . . . cannot refuse such relief 
without good grounds.”316 
Recently, a reading along these lines has been given lengthier elaboration 
in the Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to Humanitarian Relief Operations in 
Situations of Armed Conflict, commissioned by the U.N. Office for the Coordi-
nation of Humanitarian Affairs and drafted by Dapo Akande and Emanuela-
Chiara Gillard.317 It follows a number of authorities that have reached a sim-
ilar conclusion, many of them channeling the understanding of a broad range 
of States.318 As the textual basis for denying unfettered State discretion on 
this issue, the Oxford Guidance emphasizes a key terminological shift from 
Article 10 of Geneva Convention IV (also common Article 9 of Conventions 
I–III) to Articles 70 of Protocol I and 18 of Protocol II. Whereas the lan-
guage in Geneva Convention IV provides that an impartial humanitarian or-
ganization “may” undertake humanitarian action “subject to the consent of 
the party concerned,”319 Article 70 of Protocol I provides that relief actions 
for inadequately supplied civilians “shall be undertaken subject to the agree-
ment of the parties concerned” and Article 18 of Protocol II provides simi-
larly that relief “shall be undertaken subject to the consent” of the State con-
cerned whenever the civilian population is suffering “undue hardship.”320 
The linguistic shift from 1949 to 1977, it is claimed, indicates the introduc-
tion of a limit on State discretion with respect to allowing humanitarian ac-
cess during armed conflict—namely, the denial of consent may not be arbi-
trary.321 
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1997/39, annex, princ. 25(2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998). 
319. GC IV, supra note 46, art. 10.  
320. AP I, supra note 63, art. 70(1) (emphasis added); AP II, supra note 64, art. 18(2) 
(emphasis added). 
321. AKANDE & GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 87, ¶¶ 45–47; COMMEN-












Arbitrariness, of course, is a difficult standard to apply.322 In an effort to 
concretize the requirement, the Oxford Guidance specifies several factors that 
ought to inform its determination.323 These include whether it would violate 
other obligations to the civilian population, whether it would be unnecessary 
or disproportionate, and whether it would lead to injustice or to a lack of 
predictability, or would otherwise be inappropriate.324 Among these grounds 
for a finding of arbitrariness, denying access in a context in which starvation 
would result ought to be one of the least controversial, precisely because it 
is the natural implication of the ban enshrined elsewhere in the two proto-
cols.325 If there is an arbitrariness threshold, starvation encirclement would 
surely violate it. The first question, then, is whether the Oxford Guidance, the 
ICRC, the U.N. General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, the Human 
Rights Committee, and others are right to point to an arbitrariness threshold 
to begin with. 
Notably, upon their respective ratifications more than two decades after 
the treaty was agreed, the United Kingdom and France both issued reserva-
tions stating that they do not consider Article 70 to apply to blockades.326 
This supplemented a blockade exceptionalism in their interpretations of Ar-
ticle 54.327 The very fact that they felt compelled to issue reservations on the 
issue indicates a considerable level of concern within those States that, ab-
sent a reservation, Article 70 would be applied in a way that would impose 
substantive constraints on a State’s discretion to deny humanitarian access 
in a hunger blockade. In short, it indicates recognition that there is a viable 
interpretation that Article 70 does indeed impose limits on State discretion 
here. 
Watts rejects the Oxford Guidance on the grounds that it does not reflect 
unambiguous shared intent among the drafters, has not been the dominant 
understanding of Article 70, ignores a reading according to which “shall” has 
meaning in defining the obligations that flow from having granted consent 
(but not in limiting the discretion to withhold consent), and fails to explain 
why the parties did not introduce clear language specifying a non-arbitrari-
ness threshold if that is in fact what they wanted.328 He recognizes a diversity 
 
322. Marcus, supra note 2, at 268 (decrying the arbitrariness standard as raising “the 
troubling specter of ambiguity in the obligation to allow humanitarian assistance”). 
323. AKANDE & GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 87, ¶¶ 43–54. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. ¶ 51; Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 771. 
326. See supra note 185. 
327. See supra note 178. 












of State views on the issue and even suggests the final text reflected a certain 
constructive ambiguity; however, his view is that such ambiguity should sup-
port only a narrow and constrained reading of any obligations on States.329 
Whatever its force in responding to the claim that there is an arbitrariness 
limit within the Article 70 framework, this line of argument cannot underpin 
a claim of unfettered discretion on the part of the encircling power. IHL 
rules are primarily prohibitive.330 Absent explicit and unequivocal direction 
to the contrary, the failure of one rule to prohibit a particular action neither 
creates an exception to another rule that does prohibit the action nor confers 
on parties any kind of authority to engage in that action. 
Article 70 (and the analogous provision in Article 18 of Protocol II) do 
not confer any authority to abrogate the independent obligation not to use 
starvation as a method of warfare. As discussed in the previous Section, that 
independent obligation includes the duty not to cause starvation by using a 
position of encirclement to block the passage of essential goods. This im-
poses an external and categorical limit on States’ discretion to withhold Ar-
ticle 70/18 consent.331 In other words, it imposes a limit that would hold 
even if Watts were correct that the discretion to deny access is not limited 
by the internal terms of Article 70 (or Article 18 of Protocol II). Thus, the 
ICRC Commentary to Protocol II is correct to insist that the inadequate supply 
of the civilian population can create scenarios in which “the international 
relief actions provided for in Article 18 should be authorized to enable the ob-
ligation following from Article 14 to be respected.”332 
Similarly, the Israeli Supreme Court has recognized that the customary 
rules reflected in Articles 54 and 70 of Protocol I together lead to the prohi-
bition of refusing “to allow the passage of foodstuffs and basic humanitarian 
equipment necessary for the survival of the civilian population.”333 The re-
quirement to allow humanitarian relief has been described as the “corollary” 
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of the underlying starvation ban.334 And the Group of Experts on Yemen 
has reasoned that the strict prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare 
entails that in certain circumstances, “the provision of relief supplies has to 
be allowed and facilitated.”335 
This understanding of the prohibition of starvation would not render 
Articles 70 of Protocol I and 18 of Protocol II redundant. First, Article 70 
covers a broader array of scenarios than merely those involving the interac-
tion between a besieging or blockading party and an encircled population. It 
also defines the duty of a State to its own civilians in areas it controls.336 In 
that sense, it covers instances in which the denial of humanitarian access 
would not be a method of warfare, such that Article 54 would not be impli-
cated. Second, the humanitarian access frameworks in those articles apply 
whenever the civilian population is “inadequately supplied” or subject to 
“undue hardship”—thresholds that may be understood to be lower than is 
starvation (although here it would matter whether one understands the latter 
to be an outcome or a process).337 It is in the space between inadequate sup-
ply and starvation that one might debate the questions of discretion and ar-
bitrariness under Articles 70 and 18. The point here is that regardless of how 
that debate is resolved, the rules articulated in Articles 54 and 14 preclude 
encirclement starvation. 
This, again, has implications for how to understand paragraphs 103–4 of 
the San Remo Manual. The Manual’s Explanation asserts that those paragraphs 
are more demanding than is Article 70 of Protocol I.338 This is true when 
each provision is read in isolation. Paragraphs 103–4 do not appear to grant 
the encircling power the kind of discretion that might be thought to flow 
from Article 70 of Protocol I. However, when Article 70 is read together 
with Article 54 and when paragraphs 103–4 are read together with paragraph 
102, the analysis looks different. The permissiveness of paragraph 102 com-
bines with the ambiguity in 103–4 regarding how to react to contexts in 
which exclusive delivery to civilians cannot be guaranteed to provide a 
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framework for the protection against starvation encirclement that is weaker 
in certain respects than is the Additional Protocol I framework, given the 
categorical ban in Article 54. 
To be consistent with the demands of IHL, the obligations in paragraphs 
103–4 should be clarified to leave no ambiguity that they are not contingent 
on exclusive civilian delivery. Technical arrangements may be implemented 
so as to maximize the likelihood that aid will reach civilians, but civilians 
cannot be starved if those technical arrangements are insufficient to guaran-
tee exclusive civilian use. Instead, these requirements ought to be understood 
to entail a bright-line rule, requiring permission whenever its denial would 
lead to starvation. 
 
F. Allowing Civilians Out Does Not Justify Starving Those Who Remain 
 
What, then, of the argument that a besieging party engages in no violation 
vis-à-vis those that remain in starvation conditions in the encircled area, as 
long as it allows those civilians who are willing and able to leave to do so? 
This, too, is untenable under existing law. The duty to take all feasible pre-
cautions supplements belligerents’ other duties; it adds a layer of humanitar-
ian protection. That function is perverted when the fact of having taken pre-
cautions is invoked to cloak the attenuation of other IHL protections. It is 
clear that warning civilians in advance of an attack does not absolve the at-
tacking force from responsibility for complying with the demands of distinc-
tion, discrimination, and proportionality in the course of the promised op-
eration.339 Civilians do not become targets simply by failing to heed such a 
warning, nor do they cease thereby to count in the proportionality analysis.340 
There is no reason that the rule ought to be any different in the context of 
encirclement warfare than it is in the context of any other scenario to which 
precautionary obligations apply. 
On the contrary, by the terms of Protocol I, the test for losing civilian 
protection against starvation is the same as the test for whether a civilian has 
lost protection against being the target of a kinetic attack—namely, whether 
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the person is participating directly in hostilities at the time of the attack.341 
Even if one takes the controversial view that voluntary human shields rise to 
the level of direct participants in hostilities, it is implausible to hold that de-
clining to leave one’s home could qualify a person as a voluntary human 
shield and thereby a lawful target. Such a standard would eviscerate civilian 
protection.342 For that reason, it is unsurprising that there is no contemporary 
support for the view that civilians who stay voluntarily in a besieged area 
thereby become lawful targets for sniping or bombardment.343 There is, by 
extension, no basis for the claim that those civilians may be the targets of 
starvation.344 
Similarly, the mere fact that those civilians were offered a path out can-
not transform the objects of which they have been deprived from essential 
to non-essential for their survival. Indeed, even when the civilian population 
does move in response to their deprivation of indispensable objects, this itself 
is likely to implicate the encircling party in a violation. Article 54(3)(b) pro-
hibits any deprivation of indispensable objects “expected to leave the civilian 
population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or 
force its movement.”345 It is hard to see how the infliction of siege conditions 
with the offer of a path out would not qualify as forced movement in this 
respect.346 Certainly, the fact that the deprivation serves a military objective 
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is not itself sufficient to avoid that issue. The ban on forced movement in 
Article 54(3)(b) attaches specifically to situations in which the deprivation of 
the objects has a clear military benefit, and would, absent starvation or forced 
movement, therefore be permissible.347 
In some circumstances, the besieged party may itself bear responsibility 
for failing to allow or manage the evacuation of the civilians under its con-
trol.348 Depending on the conditions, that failure could amount to a violation 
of its passive precautionary obligations to “endeavour to remove the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from 
the vicinity of military objectives” and to take “other necessary precautions 
to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects un-
der their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.”349 
Perhaps in certain circumstances, the besieged party’s refusal to let civilians 
leave would be deemed a deliberate effort to use the civilian population to 
render legitimate military objectives immune from attack.350 In others, the 
besieged party might prohibit exit with a view to exploiting the ensuing ci-
vilian suffering for publicity, as part of a lawfare campaign.351 However, 
whether classified as a breach of passive precautionary duties or as a use of 
human shields, violations of this kind by the besieged party would have no 
bearing on the duties of the besieging state vis-à-vis those who remain.352 At 
most, it would mean that the wrong inflicted on the civilians that were held 
back would be the shared responsibility of the besieging and the besieged 
parties.353 
In short, in the context of encirclement warfare, the protection of civil-
ians from starvation is a categorical bright line. Articles 54 and 14 allow of 
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no exception. The ban on starvation functions prior to considerations of 
proportionality and precautions and cannot be overridden by them. It applies 




Whether encirclement starvation is a particularly effective way of engaging a 
besieged or blockaded enemy is open to debate.354 However, even assuming 
that starvation may serve valuable military purposes in certain contexts, that 
alone would not be sufficient to debunk a categorical interpretation of the 
ban. Today’s law of armed conflict is not simply subordinate to military ne-
cessity.355 It includes a range of categorical prohibitions that hold irrespective 
of the potential military advantage associated with their violation. One of 
those is the protection of both individual civilians and the civilian population 
from attack. The weaker party in an asymmetric conflict may stand to gain 
militarily by attacking the enemy’s civilian population, seeking to exploit their 
vulnerability to coerce withdrawal or compliance.356 Indeed, for some actors, 
doing so may be the only plausible route to military success. From the legal 
point of view, however, this imperative is irrelevant. The targeting of civilians 
who are not participating directly in hostilities is categorically ruled out.357 
The arguments offered in defense of allied “terror bombing” in World War 
II are clearly legally unavailable today.358 Whether or not they are the most 
effective means available, besieging forces may not employ weapons that 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective.359 
 
354. Mark Lattimer, Can Incidental Starvation of Civilians be Lawful under IHL?, EJIL:TALK! 
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/can-incidental-starvation-of-civilians-be-lawful-
under-ihl/. 
355. Historically, necessity was closer to being a normative wild card in the law of armed 
conflict. See, e.g., WITT, supra note 16, at 4, 183. However, in the contemporary law of armed 
conflict, this is no longer the case. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 
149, at 10–12.  
356. ROBERT PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 
chs. 3, 6 (2005). 
357. AP I, supra note 63, art. 51(2). 
358. WALZER, supra note 234, ch. 16. 
359. Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 461–63, 472 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 247–52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2008); 2 
INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA 












Similarly, efforts to justify the use of torture on necessity grounds have 
(with rare and highly controversial exceptions) failed to gain legal acceptance, 
despite torture advocates’ repeated invocation of the practice’s alleged ben-
efits. Aharon Barak wrote famously on behalf of the Israeli Supreme Court 
that a law-abiding State (or, in his words, a democracy) “must often fight 
with one hand tied behind its back.”360 The decision in which he made that 
claim has been criticized persuasively as itself providing more of a legitima-
tion function than a constraining one.361 Nonetheless, Barak was correct in 
his observation that compliance with the law of armed conflict does not 
guarantee the adoption of any means or method that would return a military 
advantage. 
Not only would encirclement starvation be anomalous in a regime that 
requires the infliction of death and suffering to be discriminate and targeted, 
it would be a striking anomaly, given the torturous suffering it entails. Alt-
hough it would certainly complicate the use of siege and blockade warfare,362 
the interpretation advanced here would not leave the commander bereft of 
tools by which to engage the adversary.363 Blockades of States that are mini-
mally dependent on maritime trade for essential items or where an effective 
channel for a robust supply of essentials can be maintained would not nec-
essarily fall afoul of the prohibition.364 The interdiction of contraband would 
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remain lawful even if humanitarian constraints were to preclude the imposi-
tion of a blockade.365 And partial isolation and targeted operations against 
military targets can be effective in lieu of a comprehensive encirclement.366 
Encirclement without deprivation can also be useful as a means by which to 
contain enemy forces within an area, thus precluding their deployment else-
where.367 
It is also worth noting that blockades are available only when States can 
enforce them comprehensively, so they are off the table for many belliger-
ents regardless of starvation-specific restrictions.368 This efficacy require-
ment is not ordinarily critiqued as a reason that the existing rules do not 
properly respond to military necessity, despite the fact that the States thus 
precluded from adopting encirclement tactics are (almost by definition) less 
able to draw on other resources to pursue their mission. Military necessity 
arguments that dispute humanitarian constraints that would limit the actions 
of powerful belligerents but leave unchallenged constraints that limit the ac-
tions of weaker belligerents ought to be treated with some skepticism. 
 
H. Reforming the San Remo Manual on Blockades and Starvation 
 
In sum, the San Remo Manual falls short of the Additional Protocol I standard 
of humanitarian protections in encirclement blockades because its combined 
rules do not clearly and unequivocally prohibit blockades that cause civilian 
starvation, whether as a non-exclusive purpose, as the predicate purpose to 
starving combatants within the encircled area into submission, or (on a 
broader reading of the Protocol I prohibition) as the collateral effect of any 
other deprivation of objects essential to civilian survival. The introduction 
of a proportionality rule as the safeguard in the San Remo Manual cannot fully 
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cover those gaps. Indeed, a crucial feature of Article 54 of Protocol I is to 
place a categorical ban on the starvation of civilians—to prohibit it regardless 
of the military advantage that might accrue, just as IHL prohibits the target-
ing or terrorizing of civilians, the torture of detainees, or the indiscriminate 
bombardment of areas of dense civilian population, irrespective of the mili-
tary advantage such actions may promise. 
The legal principles enshrined in the Additional Protocols have been 
confirmed in important developments since the publication of the San Remo 
Manual. As discussed above, they underpin the war crimes provisions of the 
Rome Statute.369 They have been seized upon regularly in response to the 
deprivations that have characterized the situations in Syria, South Sudan, 
Yemen, and elsewhere.370 The Security Council and other U.N. bodies have 
repeatedly condemned the use of starvation as a method of warfare, includ-
ing by denying humanitarian access.371 Although not all of these develop-
ments point unequivocally to a particular interpretation of the Additional 
Protocols, they do contribute to the customary law credentials of the core 
rules. 
In light of this, the San Remo Manual should be revised in several respects. 
Paragraph 102(a) should incorporate the categorical ban on starvation. It 
might read: “The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if 
it has the purpose or foreseeable consequence of starving the civilian popu-
lation by depriving it of objects essential for its survival.” 
On the issue of proportionality (currently included in paragraph 102(b)), 
the text can be retained, but three things ought to be clarified in the revised 
Explanation. First, the document should specify the basis for the inclusion 
of a proportionality rule and explain why that basis would not also demand 
incorporating rules of discrimination and general precautions. Second, the 
Explanation should examine the question of how proportionality is to be 
evaluated over time, particularly as civilian harm or military advantage devi-
ates from initial expectations, whether that entails adopting a prospective, 
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quota, or discount approach.372 Third, it should be clarified that the propor-
tionality rule is included as a supplement to the categorical ban on starvation, 
rather than as its replacement. In other words, it should be clear that the 
proportionality constraint is relevant primarily to civilian suffering caused by 
factors other than the deprivation of essential objects, such that no assess-
ment of military advantage would legitimate the latter.373 
Paragraph 103 should be framed to specify that any imposition of tech-
nical arrangements or supervision conditions cannot impede humanitarian 
access to the point of causing the starvation of civilians, even if that means 
that essential objects allowed through cannot be guaranteed to benefit the 
civilian population exclusively. That could entail adding the following at the 
end of the provision: “In no case shall the imposition of technical arrange-
ments or conditions on the distribution of essential supplies impede the de-
livery of such supplies to the point of causing the starvation of civilians.” 
A similar clarification should be added to the technical arrangements 
provision of paragraph 104. Even if the existing text of these two provisions 
were to be retained, the proper interpretation could be clarified in the Ex-
planation. 
 
VI. BEYOND BLOCKADE: TWO NORMATIVE TRENDS THAT CANNOT 
BE IGNORED IN THE SAN REMO UPDATE 
 
Before closing, it is worth noting two broader dimensions of normative 
change since the Manual’s publication that have particularly significant impli-
cations for the revision process, both at the level of the encirclement provi-
sions, but also across the document as a whole. The first is the extension by 
custom of many IHL rules to the realm of NIACs. The second is the growing 
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A. The Law of Armed Conflict for NIACs 
 
In the opening paragraphs of the San Remo Manual’s Explanation, the authors 
write, “although the provisions of this Manual are primarily meant to apply 
to international armed conflict at sea, this has intentionally not been ex-
pressly indicated in paragraph 1 in order not to dissuade the implementation 
of these rules in non-international armed conflicts involving naval opera-
tions.”374 The Turkel Commission took this language to support application 
of the Manual’s rules (including on blockades) to NIACs.375 Predictably, that 
interpretation has been criticized as straightforwardly inconsistent with the 
text upon which it relies.376 Indeed, it seems fairly clear that the Manual takes 
no position on whether or not any of the specific rules it articulates have 
customary or even emerging status in NIACs. 
Just sixteen months after the Manual’s provisions were initially adopted, 
the Appeals Chamber of the fledgling International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia ruled that many (though not all) rules of IHL apply 
to NIACs as a matter of custom, even though most treaty provisions focus 
exclusively on IACs.377 Famously, the chamber complemented a survey of 
State practice and opinio juris on the issue with the more normative observa-
tion that “what is inhumane in international war cannot but be inhumane 
and consequently prohibited in civil strife.”378 Regardless of one’s view of 
the soundness of the Tribunal’s legal determination in 1995, it is now the 
dominant view among IHL experts. The Tadić decision has become one of 
the most cited judicial interventions in the history of international law.379 
A decade later, the ICRC released what remains the most comprehensive 
single study of customary IHL.380 Confirming the thrust of the Tadić decision, 
it determined that the overwhelming majority of IHL rules apply to both 
NIACs and IACs. The study was not intended to cover naval warfare, but 
its identification of a trend in IHL towards the comprehensive regulation of 
 
374. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 1.1. 
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376. Buchan, supra note 155, at 268. 
377. Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 120, ¶¶ 96–127. 
378. Id. ¶ 119. 
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national law textbooks in ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 
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NIACs has implications beyond the intended scope of the study.381 The 
ICRC’s methodology has been subject to much scrutiny,382 but the NIAC 
trend is one that has gained widespread recognition. One year later, the In-
ternational Institute of Humanitarian Law built on the success of the San 
Remo Manual on armed conflicts at sea by publishing a Manual on the Law of 
Non-International Armed Conflict, which also endorses the theory of significant 
convergence in the law applicable to IACs and NIACs.383 The latter Manual 
does not articulate any specific limitation as to the domains to which it ap-
plies. It addresses free-floating naval mines and duties to the shipwrecked 
but says nothing on a range of other issues specific to naval warfare.384 As 
noted above, the war crimes code incorporated into the ICC Statute incor-
porates many of the key IAC war crimes in its NIAC list (now including 
starvation) and does not exclude naval warfare.385 
In light of these intervening developments, the revised Manual on Inter-
national Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea cannot credibly replicate 
the first edition’s avoidance of the NIAC question. What a review of that 
issue will mean for the blockade provisions is not clear, as blockade law is 
one of the remaining issues on which there remains significant support for 
the view that it is limited to IACs.386 This, however, only underscores the 
inadequacy of the San Remo Manual’s consignment of the starvation prohibi-
tion to its blockade law framework. As a result of that approach, the Manual 
fails to address other potentially significant forms of naval starvation war-
fare, particularly, though not exclusively, in NIACs. This flies in the face of 
the clear basis in treaty and custom for the application of the ban on starva-
tion of civilians as a method of warfare in all forms of armed conflict, re-
gardless of whether the method of warfare in question qualifies as a block-
ade. 
 
381. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 70, at xxxvi. 
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383. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE 
LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (Michael N. Schmitt, Charles H. B. Gar-
away & Yoram Dinstein eds., 2006). 
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385. See supra notes 106-123, 248–254 and accompanying text. 
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The implications for the Manual of the rise of customary IHL in NIACs 
in the quarter-century since the first edition are wide-ranging. On the specific 
issue at hand here, if the revised manual finds sufficient customary basis for 
the application of blockade law to NIACs, the application of paragraphs 
102–4 to the latter context ought to be made explicit. Additionally, and re-
gardless of whether the Group of Experts determines that blockade law ap-
plies in NIACs, the revised manual ought to clarify that the prohibition of 
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare applies to all naval methods of 
warfare in both IACs and NIACs, and not only to blockades. In evaluating 
whether measures such as those imposed by the Saudi- and Emirati-led co-
alition on Yemen violate the starvation ban, the question should be whether 
those measures constitute the infliction of starvation as a method of warfare, 
not whether the action is a blockade, or whether the armed conflict is inter-
national or non-international. 
 
B. International Human Rights Law and Armed Conflict 
 
A second development has equally wide-ranging implications. The San Remo 
Manual was framed not as a restatement of the law of armed conflict appli-
cable at sea, but as a restatement of “international law applicable to armed 
conflicts at sea.” Thus, the Manual incorporates rules from the jus ad bellum 
and the law of neutrality, as well as rules of IHL. 387 Reading the text today, 
however, there is a prominent omission. In the quarter-century since the 
Manual’s publication, longstanding grounds for asserting the applicability of 
IHRL to State conduct in armed conflict have gained traction with a broad 
range of relevant legal authorities, including the International Court of Jus-
tice, the European, Inter-American, and African human rights courts, the 
Human Rights Committee, and others.388 Most States have now recognized 
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the applicability of human rights law in armed conflict, and even those that 
have been resistant to this trend have equivocated in that respect.389 Notably, 
the Security Council has also invoked human rights in armed conflict situa-
tions regularly in the period since the San Remo Manual was published.390 
Of course, precisely how the regimes of IHRL and IHL are to interact 
when both apply remains the subject of significant debate and has not always 
been addressed consistently within the jurisprudence of individual courts or 
other interpretive authorities. Some hold that both regimes apply unless they 
diverge in their requirements, in which case IHL applies as the armed-con-
flict-specific interpretation of IHRL (the lex specialis).391 Alternatively, other 
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authorities approach the issue along the lines defined in Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides for different 
treaties to be interpreted in light of one another, with neither in a position 
of presumptive priority.392 On that approach, divergent rules may be harmo-
nized through a hybrid, coordinated interpretation. 393 In still other instances, 
bodies with human rights authority have applied human rights law straight-
forwardly in circumstances of armed conflict, regardless of potentially diver-
gent rules of IHL, unless there is a direct contradiction (as when the latter 
would require the violation of the former).394 
Beyond that core issue of interpretative interaction are further layers of 
complexity and uncertainty. For example, debates regarding the degree to 
which IHL is facilitative or prohibitive have implications for the extent to 
which the law of armed conflict is in tension with IHRL on any given issue 
in the first place.395 Additionally, there is the longstanding issue of any par-
ticular human rights regime’s applicability to State conduct outside the lat-
ter’s territory. A State’s flag vessels are relatively straightforwardly included 
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within its sphere of human rights responsibility, as are persons held in de-
tention by its agents.396 More complex, however, are questions regarding the 
application of human rights law to State acts or omissions vis-à-vis persons 
not on one of its flagged vessels, but who are affected by decisions made by 
those who control those vessels. The precise threshold at which human 
rights protections kick in in such circumstances is not uniform across re-
gimes.397 How it applies in the context of economic and social rights is par-
ticularly unclear, notwithstanding the fact that the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has no territorial jurisdictional 
clause and even requires “international assistance and co-operation” in the 
progressive realization of the rights enshrined.398 
Assuming territorial application, deprivation by encirclement raises sig-
nificant issues for the rights to life, food (and freedom from hunger), health, 
and possibly torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, housing, 
and freedom of movement, among others.399 Without providing specifics, 
the Security Council’s landmark resolution on starvation in armed conflict 
invokes IHRL twice alongside IHL, including by demanding that “all parties 
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to armed conflicts fully comply with their obligations under international 
law, including international human rights law, as applicable.”400 
Whether or not the San Remo revision can fully explore how to think 
about specific human rights in the context of a blockade,401 the new manual 
will need to confront the general mechanics of the interaction between hu-
man rights law and humanitarian law and to articulate some overarching 
principles on the specific complexities of the application of human rights law 
at sea. The drafters could, of course, choose to define the manual’s scope in 
a more restrictive way than they did in 1994, focusing exclusively on the law 
of armed conflict, rather than international law applicable to armed conflicts 
at sea. However, doing so would deviate from the original framing and re-
duce the new manual’s utility, given that these challenges are central to the 




The lack of any comprehensive treaty on the law of armed conflict at sea 
remains a major gap in existing IHL. Given that void and the unique features 
of naval warfare, the San Remo Manual has tremendous importance as the 
most prominent and widely read restatement of the law in that domain. 
Much of its text is replicated in military manuals around the world. Its revi-
sion offers an important opportunity to update it to accommodate both tech-
nological and legal developments. It also offers an opportunity to reflect 
upon and revisit the original draft on its own terms. 
That reflection ought to lead to a revision of the provisions on blockade 
and a more comprehensive incorporation of the prohibition of the starvation 
of civilians as a method of warfare. The introduction of humanitarian pro-
tections into the law of blockade in the text agreed in 1994 was an important 
step. However, it did not reach as far as the law of the time, and it falls short 
of the legal posture on starvation today. Amending that in the revision and 
clarifying both that the prohibition applies to naval methods of warfare other 
than blockade and that there is an equivalent restriction in NIACs ought to 
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401. Adopting a lex specialis approach, see, e.g., TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
133, ¶¶ 98–100. Arguing that ultimate limits of IHRL must constrain any interpretation of 
IHL here, see Coco, Hemptinne & Lander, supra note 289, at 917 (“Any interpretation of 
the law of armed conflict should be acceptable only insofar as it allows protection for the 
minimum core of the right to food, which would definitely include the right to be free (and 












have high priority in the Manual’s revision. The group of experts preparing 
the revision must also consider how and with what degree of detail to engage 
with human rights law, which could itself have significant implications for 
blockades and other encirclements. 
 
